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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) and Rule 
3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES. 
All issues on appeal involve the trial court's legal 
conclusions; this Court reviews those conclusions for legal 
correctness without deference. Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) . This review is of a summary judgment, so the 
facts and reasonable inferences from those facts are construed in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Andreini v. 
Hultgren. 860 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1993). This appeal raises the 
following issues: 
1. Did the trial court err in determining as a matter of 
law against disputed facts that appellant was or reasonably 
should have been aware of the facts underlying her causes of 
action from the time she was aware L.D.S. Social Services (Social 
Services) had taken her son for adoption placement instead of 
from the time she became aware that Social Services took her 
adoption consent when she lacked the capacity to give it? 
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That issue was preserved in the District Court by the 
following: 
a. Appellees' motion for summary judgment and 
memorandum, Record on Appeal, pp. 199-201 & 206-41; 
b. Appellant's memorandum in opposition, Record on 
Appeal, pp. 257-86/ 
c. Appellees' reply memorandum, Record on Appeal, pp. 
351-62; 
d. Hearing of the motion, Record on Appeal, pp. 386-
91; and 
e. The District Court's Order and Judgment, Record on 
Appeal, pp. 369-71. 
2. Did the trial court err in not allowing plaintiff to 
amend her complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true 
names as learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement 
of plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of 
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better? 
That issue was preserved in the District Court by the 
following: 
a. Appellant's motion for permission to amend, 
memorandum, and proposed second amended complaint, Record on 
Appeal, pp. 143-47; 
b. Appellees' memorandum in opposition, Record on 
Appeal, pp. 148-55; 
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c. Appellant's reply memorandum, Record on Appeal, 
pp. 156-94. 
d. The District Court's February 20, 1996, minute 
entry ruling, Record on Appeal, pp. 197-98/ and 
e. The District Court's March 26, 1996, order, Record 
on Appeal, pp. 244-45. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. 
The addendum contains copies of the following statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2) 
V. STATEMENT OP THE CASE. 
Appellant brought her complaint on May 20, 1993. On 
February 27, 1995, she brought an amended complaint alleging four 
causes of action against appellees and a number of defendants 
named by the fictitious name Doe for negligence, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, constructive fraud and breach 
of contract. Appellant brought a motion for permission to bring 
a second amended complaint which appellees opposed and the 
District Court denied. Appellees brought a motion for summary 
judgment against the amended complaint, alleging in relevant part 
that statutes of limitation in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-4(1), 78-
12-25(3) and 78-12-23(2) barred appellant's claims. The District 
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Court, by Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, ruled that Utah Code Ann. §78-
14-1, et seq., the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, did not 
apply but "by any applicable statute of limitations, the case on 
all causes of action is time-barred..." Record on Appeal, pg. 
391. 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The following facts were undisputed and taken as true for 
purposes of defendants' motion for summary judgment: 
1. In January, 1967, appellant was 23 years old, a 
graduate student at Illinois Teacher's College -- Chicago North 
(now Northeastern illinois University) and pregnant from an 
acquaintance rape. Appellant's Aff. \2, Record on Appeal, pg. 
287. 
2. From 1967 to the present, appellant has been a member of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the Church). 
Appellant's Aff. f3, Record on Appeal pg. 287. 
3. Appellant desired to obtain the Church's advice 
regarding her pregnancy. She obtained that advice from the 
Church's Relief Society, predecessor in interest to defendant 
Social Services (together referred to as "Social Services"). 
Social Services instructed her it was Church counsel that she 
would ruin the child's life if she did anything other than submit 
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the child to Social Services for adoption placement. Appellant's 
Aff. 14, Record on Appeal pg. 288. 
4. During January, 1967, Social Services employed Gladys 
Carling as a case worker. Carling Aff. %A. Record on Appeal pg. 
306. 
5. As a regular part of her case worker duties, Mrs. 
Carling obtained consents to adopt according to the following 
procedure: 
a* Usually she would meet with the birth mother 
before the birth mother entered the hospital. 
b. Mrs. Carling would inform the hospital the mother 
was under Social Services' jurisdiction, request that the 
hospital inform her when the birth occurred, and request that the 
hospital not publish the birth otherwise. 
c. The hospital would inform Mrs. Carling of the 
birth and of the mother's and child's general condition. 
d. If there was no urgency regarding the mother's or 
child's health, Mrs. Carling would visit the mother one or two 
days after the birth. 
e. If the birth mother desired to relinquish the 
child, Mrs. Carling obtained her consent on the standard form 
release which L.D.S. Social Services used at the time. 
f. In accord with Social Services' policy: 
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i. Mrs. Carling was the only witness to the 
birth mother's execution of the release; 
ii. Mrs. Carling acted as notary; and, 
iii. Mrs. Carling did not review the birth 
mother's medical records or otherwise inquire about the birth 
mother's physical or mental capacity. 
Carling Aff. Hi, Record on Appeal pp. 306-07. 
6. Mrs. Carling met appellant several times between 
November, 1966, and January, 1967. Carling Aff. \2, Record on 
Appeal pg. 308. 
7. As of those meetings, appellant had not decided to 
relinquish the child. Carling Aff. i|3, Record on Appeal pg. 308. 
8. In those meetings, Mrs. Carling noticed appellant was 
outspoken, direct and capable of forming her own opinion. Carling 
Aff. 1(4, Record on Appeal pg. 308. 
9. Appellant entered St. Benedict's Hospital (the 
Hospital) on January 14, 1967, and gave birth to a healthy son. 
Appellant's Aff. %5, Record on Appeal, pg. 288. 
10. Immediately after appellant gave birth and throughout 
her Hospital stay, her physician directed the hospital to 
administer the antipsychotic drug Thorazine. Appellant's Aff. 
17, Record on Appeal pg. 288. 
11. The Thorazine incapacitated appellant physically, 
mentally, emotionally and spiritually- The Thorazine completely 
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removed from appellant the maternal instinct which would have 
prompted her to keep her child and removed from appellant her 
ability to obtain personal revelation and spiritual guidance. At 
times appellant completely lost consciousness. Appellant's Aff. 
118, Record on Appeal pg. 2 88. 
12. Mrs. Carling met with appellant next on January 16, 
1967, two days after appellant gave birth to her son. Carling 
Aff. %5, Record on Appeal pg. 308. 
13. Mrs. Carling noticed appellant was not herself. Mrs. 
Carling found appellant to be passive, indifferent and 
unaffected. Carling Aff. ]6, Record on Appeal pg. 3 08. 
14. Nonetheless, Mrs. Carling obtained appellant's consent, 
took the baby with her and placed the baby in L.D.S. Social 
Services' foster care. Carling Aff. \l, Record on Appeal pg. 
308. 
15. Social Services had access to appellant's medical 
records. Appellant's Aff. 1l0, Record on Appeal pg. 288. 
16. As was her standard practice, Mrs. Carling recorded the 
subject events on an audio tape. Carling Aff. 18, Record on 
Appeal pg. 308. 
17. In that recording, Mrs. Carling stated she believed 
appellant was sedated at the time she gave her ostensible 
consent. Carling Aff. 1|9, Record on Appeal pg. 308. 
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18. Several times after her delivery, appellant expressed 
to Mrs. Carling her confusion, remorse, heartache and void from 
the loss of her child. Carling Aff. ^10, Record on Appeal pg. 
308; 
19. Appellant diligently inquired of Social Services 
regarding the adoption and her son. Appellant's Aff. f26, Record 
on Appeal pg. 291. 
20. For example, on January 18, 1967, appellant and her 
mother visited Social Services to inquire about appellant's son 
and the adoption and to inform Social Services of appellant's 
sorrow, confusion and regret. Social Services failed to inform 
appellant of her incapacity and failed to provide any information 
about how it had obtained appellant's consent. Appellant's Aff. 
127, Record on Appeal pg. 291. 
21. After January 18, 1967, appellant inquired of Social 
Services through its various agents approximately thirty more 
times about her son and the adoption. Social Services told 
appellant it could give her no other information regarding the 
adoption or her son. Appellant's Aff. 128, Record on Appeal pg. 
291-92. 
22. Under Social Services' policy, Social Services would 
not allow appellant or any birth mother to revoke her consent 
based on remorse, grief, heartache, or void from the loss of the 
child. Carling Aff. Ill, Record on Appeal pg, 309. 
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23. Appellant trusted the Church beyond question. Her 
trust and confidence in the Church removed from her any suspicion 
that the Church acted wrongly in obtaining her consent. 
Appellant's Aff. |^12, Record on Appeal pg. 289. 
24. Appellant desired to be responsible for the costs of 
her own and her child's care so on or about July 7, 1969, she 
asked the hospital to provide her with her records so she could 
pay for the costs she had incurred. Appellant's Aff. 1|l3, 
Record on Appeal pg. 289. 
25. The hospital responded as follows: 
Since the records of our no information 
maternity patients are destroyed, I can only 
send you an estimated amount. 
A correct copy of the hospital's reply is attached as 
exhibit B to appellant's affidavit and appears at pg. 297 of the 
record on appeal. Appellant's Aff. Kl4, Record on Appeal pg. 
289. 
26. From the Hospital's reply, appellant reasonably assumed 
her records had been destroyed and she could have no access to 
them. Appellant's Aff. Kl5, Record on Appeal pg. 289. 
27. Over 23 years after the birth of her son, appellant and 
her son were reunited. Appellant's Aff. 1l6, Record on Appeal 
pg. 289. 
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28. Appellant desired to obtain her son's medical records 
and requested them from the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990. 
Appellant's Aff. ^17, Record on Appeal pg. 289. 
29. In response to appellant's request, on or about May 29, 
1990, the Hospital gave her copies not of her son's records as I 
had requested but of her own records, which she reasonably had 
assumed were destroyed. Appellant's Aff. 1l8, Record on Appeal 
pg. 289. 
30. On or about May 29, 1990, on receipt of her own medical 
records, appellant learned for the first time she had been 
drugged with Thorazine during her entire Hospital stay. 
Appellant's Aff. i[l9, Record on Appeal pg. 290. 
31. Social Services never had given appellant a copy of the 
release. After she obtained her medical records, in or about 
August, 1990, appellant visited Social Services to determine what 
documentation, if any, Social Services had of the authority it 
claimed in placing appellant's son for adoption. Appellant then 
obtained from Social Services a copy of the release. A copy of 
the release is attached to appellant's affidavit as exhibit A and 
appears at page 294 of the record on appeal. Appellant's Aff. 
f20, Record on Appeal pg. 290. 
32. By matching the release with her hospital records, 
appellant discovered for the first time Social Services had 
obtained her ostensible consent while appellant was incapacitated 
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from the effects of the drug Thorazine. Appellant's Aff. ^ [20, 
Record on Appeal pg. 2 90. 
33. After learning she had signed the release while 
incapacitated, appellant sought redress unceasingly for over two 
years. Appellant's Aff. 1)21, Record on Appeal pg. 290. 
34. Appellant pursued her claim through every level of 
Church judiciary. Appellant's Aff. J22f Record on Appeal pg. 
290. 
35. Appellant issued the following correspondence, correct 
copies of which are attached to appellant's affidavit as 
designated: 
a. Appellant to Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding 
Bishop, 11/8/91, attached as exhibit C. 
b. Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding Bishop, to 
appellant, 11/18/91, attached as exhibit D. 
c. Appellant to Dr. Harold C. Brown, Director of 
Social Services, 12/6/91, attached as exhibit E. 
d. Dr. Harold C. Brown, Director of Social Services, 
to appellant, 12/19/91, attached as exhibit F. 
e. Appellant to Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding 
Bishop, 1/3/92, attached as exhibit G. 
f. Appellant to Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding 
Bishop, 1/6/92, attached as exhibit H. 
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g. Bishop Glenn L. Pace, Presiding Bishop, to 
appellant, 2/12/92, attached as exhibit I. 
Appellant's Aff. ^23, Record on Appeal pg. 290. 
36. Appellant sought audience with Church authority at 
every available level, including her Bishop, Stake President, 
Regional Representative, Area President and, finally, the 
Presiding Bishop. Appellant's Aff. 124, Record on Appeal pg. 291. 
37. Painfully, appellant last resorted to this lawsuit, 
having exhausted all remedies within the Church. Appellant's Aff. 
f25, Record on Appeal pg. 291. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
I. APPEAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER PARAGRAPHS 2 THROUGH 7 
REGARDING STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
A. Appellant's claims are timely. The claims accrued when she 
discovered the legal cause of her injury. 
The limitation period applicable to a cause of action begins 
to run when the cause of action accrues. Merkley v. Beaslin. 778 
P.2d 16, 18 (Utah App. 1989); Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1. 
Appellant's causes of action accrued when she discovered the 
facts underlying her causes of action. Her causes of action 
accrued when she discovered Social Services took her ostensible 
consent while she lacked the capacity to give it. 
Appellant proposed the discovery rule and the District Court 
tacitly ruled it did not apply. The mere language of the 
District Court's ruling reveals its error in determining whether 
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to apply the discovery rule. The court ordered "Plaintiff knew 
of her injury, the loss of her child, upon leaving the hospital 
in 1967, and her cause of action accrued at that time." Record 
on Appeal, pg. 370. But the District Court failed to distinguish 
between appellant's physical injury, the loss of her son, and 
appellant's legal injury, Social Services' taking of appellant's 
consent when she lacked the capacity to give it. Until 1990, 
when by coincidence appellant discovered the medical records she 
though had been destroyed, appellant did not and reasonably could 
not know of the facts underlying her causes of action. She did 
not and reasonably could not know the circumstances under which 
Social Services derived her flawed consent. 
Because appellant was unaware of and reasonably could not 
have discovered the facts underlying her causes of action, the 
discovery rule applies to toll the applicable statutes of 
limitation. Here: 1) it would be irrational or unjust to 
consider appellant's causes of action to have accrued at the time 
she lost her son; and 2) the limitation period is tolled by the 
defendants' concealment. 
1. Rational and just application of the statutes. 
To determine whether it is rational and just to bar the 
claim, the Court balances "the hardship the statute of 
limitations would impose on the appellant in the circumstances of 
the case outweighed any prejudice to the defendant from 
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difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time." Klinaer v. 
Rightly. 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990) citing Myers. 635 P.2d at 
87. Here, considering plaintiff's cause of action to have 
accrued when Social Services took her child, instead of when she 
discovered their misconduct, is irrational and unjust and will 
work an ultimate hardship on her. In contrast, it will cause no 
prejudice to appellees. I 
To consider appellant's actions to have accrued when she 
executed the release will impose on appellant complete hardship; 
it will dispose of her claims before they accrued. Appellant had 
no knowledge or notice of defendants' misconduct. She knew she 
no longer had her son. She knew of her grief. She knew of her 
bewilderment and despair. But all appellant's sorrow and 
confusion would not persuade Social Services to let appellant 
void the contract. She had no claim to bring until she learned 
she had given her consent while incapacitated. 
In contrast, to consider appellant's claims to have accrued 
when appellant became aware of appellee's misconduct will cause 
defendants no prejudice. Appellees' arguments of prejudice are 
unsupported by and contrary to the uncontroverted facts. 
Appellees offer just bare, unsupported arguments of prejudice 
unsupported by the record. The present lawsuit is preserved well 
and can be presented well. To allow it will give appellant her 
rightful day in court and will do defendants no injustice. 
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Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation 
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the 
legal cause of her injury. The date of her physical injury is 
irrelevant. Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, and she 
filed timely in May, 1993. 
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2. Appellees' concealment. 
Limitation periods are tolled while a defendant conceals a 
claim. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996). The rule 
applies on appellant's prima facie showing of fraudulent 
concealment and demonstration that given the defendant's actions 
a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered her claim 
earlier. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53. "The application of this 
legal rule to any particular set of facts is necessarily a matter 
left to trial courts and finders of fact." 
Here, Gladys S. Carling, the Social Services employee who 
took appellant's consent, was aware appellant was sedated and 
affected when she obtained appellant's release. Mrs. Carling 
officially recorded her perception that appellant was sedated and 
affected so Social Services shared Mrs. Carling7s awareness. 
Mrs. Carling also acted as the only witness to the transaction 
and as notary. Social Services maintained to itself sole control 
of the transaction and of all information surrounding the 
transaction. Appellant had no memory of executing the release. 
After the adoption, appellant diligently inquired of Social 
Services regarding the adoption and her son. Although aware of 
appellant's flawed consent, Social Services told appellant they 
could give her no other information regarding the adoption or her 
son. Social Services would not give appellant a copy of the 
release until August, 1990, after appellant confronted Social 
Services with the medical records which revealed her incapacity. 
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Given the appellees' actions appellant acted reasonably and 
could not have discovered her claim earlier. See Berenda, 914 
P.2d at 53. Appellant inquired diligently of Social Services. 
She reasonably believed her medical records had been destroyed. 
But there is more. Appellant had trust and confidence in Social 
Services as an agent of the Church to which she was and remains 
devoted. Although she was hurt and confused, her faith in the 
Church removed any suspicion of wrongdoing. It never would have 
occurred to her that her Church would avail itself of her 
incapacity. Social Services' extraordinary influence overcame 
the instinct she otherwise would have had to inquire into any 
wrongdoing. That influence never waned. Appellants had a duty 
to disclose to appellant material facts regarding the transaction 
or facts exclusively in defendants' control. But in spite of 
ample opportunity, defendants' concealed from defendant that the 
release was flawed. She did not and could not know of her claims 
until fate gave her the knowledge Social Services would not. 
Against the background of appellees' concealment, appellant 
reasonably could not have discovered her claims any sooner. 
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation period 
began to run when appellant first was able to discover the legal 
cause of her injury. Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, 
and she filed timely in May, 1993• 
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B. The District Court granted summary judgment although there 
are material facts in dispute. 
The District Court's granted summary judgment in the face of 
numerous core issues which properly are questions of fact for the 
jury and as to each of which appellant offered substantial 
evidence to place the issue in dispute, as follows: 
1. When appellant knew or with reasonable diligence should 
have known of the facts underlying her causes of action so to 
commence running of the statute of limitations. 
2. The point at which appellant reasonably should have 
known that she had suffered a legal injury so to commence running 
of the limitation period. 
3. The reasonableness of appellant's efforts to discover 
her legal injury. 
4. Whether appellees' concealment of her claims tolled 
statutes of limitations. 
5. The existence of a confidential relationship. 
The District Court improperly denied appellant her day in 
court to resolve those factual issues. Paragraphs 2 through 7 of 
the District Court's summary judgment order must be reversed. 
C. The summary judgment order erroneously relies on 
evidence of issues not properly before the court. 
The issues of appellant's contractual capacity and of the 
release's validity or invalidity were not before the District 
Court. The validity or invalidity of appellant's consent was not 
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properly before the District Court and cannot be the basis for 
its ruling. At the very least, the matter of appellant's 
capacity remains in dispute as a question of fact for the 
District Court to consider on proper proof. Based on the 
inappropriate finding that appellant had contractual capacity, 
paragraphs 2 through 7 of the summary judgment order are flawed 
and cannot endure. 
II. THE ORDER DISALLOWING THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Appellant moved for permission to file a second amended 
complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true names as 
learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement of 
plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of 
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better. 
A. Amendments should be allowed liberally. 
To properly frame the issues, to allow the parties a fair 
opportunity to present their claims, and to assure that trials 
conform to and include all relevant facts and applicable law, 
courts liberally should allow the parties to amend their 
pleadings. 
B. The amendment should be allowed to substitute certain doe 
defendants' names as learned in discovery. 
Plaintiff fashioned her second amended complaint based on 
the information defendants provided in discovery regarding 
certain defendants' roles and identities. Based on that 
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information she substituted certain doe defendants' true names. 
When appellant learned the doe defendants' true names, Rule 
9(a)(2) mandated she amend her complaint to name them. The 
District Court erred in disallowing that mandatory amendment. 
C. The amendment would not prejudice the appellees• 
The amendment's factual matter was based on information 
defendants provided in discovery so they must already have notice 
of it. The amendment added no new causes of action. The 
appellees cannot complain they would have an inadequate 
opportunity "to meet the newly raised matter," factual or legal. 
The District Court should have allowed the amendment. It's 
order denying appellant permission to amend is in error and 
should be reversed. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation 
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the 
legal cause of her injury. Appellant's action accrued in August, 
1990, and she filed timely in May, 1993. The District Court 
improperly denied appellant her day in court to resolve factual 
issues necessary to a proper ruling. It's improper determination 
of those fact issues included inappropriate findings on issues 
not properly before the District Court. Paragraphs 2 through 7 of 
the District Court's summary judgment order must be reversed. 
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The District Court also disallowed a second amended 
complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true names as 
learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement of 
plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of 
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better. The 
District Court should have allowed the amendment. The District 
Court's order denying appellant permission to amend is in error 
and should be reversed. 
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VIII. ARGUMENT. 
I. APPEAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER PARAGRAPHS 2 THROUGH 7 
REGARDING STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
The District Court ruled: 
The Court finds, as a matter of law from the facts 
stated herein, that she knew that she was injured once 
she had her full faculties following the birth of the 
child; that she didn't take steps to reasonably 
discover what, if any, the cause of any incapacity was. 
The Court finds that, by any applicable statute of 
limitations, the case on all causes of action is time 
barred; and is dismissed, accordingly, with prejudice. 
Record on Appeal, pp. 3 90-91. Based on that ruling, the 
District Court ordered as follows: 
(2) Plaintiff's tort claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations in U.C.A. §78-12-25(3), and 
plaintiff's contract claims is barred by the statute of 
limitations in U.C.A. §78-12-23(2). 
(3) Plaintiff knew of her injury, the loss of her 
child, upon leaving the hospital in 1967, and her cause 
of action accrued at that time. j 
(4) The administration of Thorazine was 
reasonably discoverable by plaintiff within the 
limitations period following her release from the 
hospital, but plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps 
to discover the cause of her alleged incapacity? 
(5) Plaintiff was on notice to inquire about the 
circumstances surrounding the taking of her consent 
because, as she alleged, "not a day has passed since 
January, 1967, that plaintiff has not felt the deep 
heartache and void for the loss of her child and the 
loss of the joys of motherhood." 
(6) Plaintiff's action is time barred under any 
applicable statute of limitation, and her Amended 
Complaint is accordingly dismissed with prejudice. 
(7) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. 
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Record on Appeal, pg. 3 70. 
Appellant appeals from those paragraphs of the District 
Court's order by presenting to this Court the following issue: 
Did the trial court err in determining as a matter 
of law against disputed facts that appellant was or 
reasonably should have been aware of the facts 
underlying her causes of action from the time she was 
aware Social Services had taken her son for adoption 
placement instead of from the time she became aware 
that Social Services took her adoption consent when she 
lacked the capacity to give it? 
A. Appellant's claims are timely. The claims accrued when she 
discovered the legal cause of her injury. 
The limitation period applicable to a cause of action begins 
to run when the cause of action accrues. Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 
P.2d 16, 18 (Utah App. 1989); Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1. 
Appellant's causes of action accrued when she discovered the 
facts underlying her causes of action. Her causes of action 
accrued when she discovered Social Services took her ostensible 
consent while she lacked the capacity to give it. 
Appellant proposed the discovery rule and the District Court 
tacitly ruled it did not apply. The mere language of the 
District Court's ruling reveals its error in determining whether 
to apply the discovery rule. The court ordered "Plaintiff knew 
of her injury, the loss of her child, upon leaving the hospital 
in 1967, and her cause of action accrued at that time." Record 
on Appeal, pg. 370. But the District Court failed to distinguish 
between appellant's physical injury, the loss of her son, and 
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appellant's legal injury, Social Services' taking of appellant's 
consent when she lacked the capacity to give it. Until 1990, 
when by coincidence appellant discovered the medical records she 
though had been destroyed, appellant did not and reasonably could 
not know of the facts underlying her causes of action. She did 
not and reasonably could not know the circumstances under which 
Social Services derived her flawed consent, 
"Before a period of limitation may be tolled under either 
the fraudulent concealment or exceptional circumstances versions 
of the discovery rule, an initial showing must be made that the 
plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have discovered 
the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an 
action within that period." Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 55 
(Utah 1996) citing Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 
1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) .x To determine when a plaintiff 
reasonably could discover the facts underlying a cause of action, 
the Court must distinguish between the plaintiff's physical 
injury and legal injury. The Court must determine when the 
plaintiff discovered the misconduct which caused the physical 
injury. In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147-48 (Utah 1979), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
1
 Although the discovery rule applies judicially here, cases 
in which the discovery rule applies statutorily apply similar logic 
and are guiding. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 at fn. 2 (Utah 
1996). 
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We see no basis for making a legal distinction 
between having no knowledge of an injury, as was the 
case in Christiansen, and no knowledge that a known 
injury was caused by unknown negligence. 
Id. at 148, referring to Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 
1968) . 
The Foil court interpreted the word injury in the Health 
Care Malpractice Act not to mean physical injury but to mean the 
negligence which caused the physical injury, so that the statute 
does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the legal 
cause of her injury. See also Araaon v. Clover Club Foods 
Company, 857 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1993)(products liability). 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the same logic to general 
statutes of limitation without statutory discovery provisions. 
Merkley, 778 P.2d 16, 18. 
In Merkley. a case of legal malpractice, the court noted 
that although a.plaintiff may know she has been injured, 
knowledge of that injury does not begin the limitation period. 
Rather, the determining factor is "whether the injured party was 
aware, or should have been aware, that the damage or injury 
alleged was related to a specific legal transaction or 
undertaking previously rendered to him or her," i.e., whether the 
injured party was aware of the misconduct which caused her 
injury. Merkley. 778 P.2d at 19. Here, plaintiff was not and 
reasonably could not have been aware that her damage or injury 
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was related to appellees' misconduct in time to commence an 
action within the limitation period. 
On January 14, 1967, plaintiff gave birth to a healthy son. 
Two days later, Social Services obtained her ostensible consent 
and took appellant's son to place for adoption. Not a day since 
has passed that plaintiff fails to grieve for that loss. 
Appellees claim that appellant's knowledge she had lost her son 
equals knowledge of her injury and thus knowledge of her claims. 
But although appellant obviously was aware she had lost her son, 
she was completely unaware of the circumstances under which 
Social Services derived her flawed consent; she was completely 
unaware of the facts underlying her causes of action. 
Appellant had no suspicion of wrongdoing to put her on 
notice of her claims. Appellant loves and trusts the Church and 
its offices. Appellant's Aff. 1l2. Her confidence in the Church 
and its offices defeated all suspicion that Social Services had 
acted wrongly in the transaction. Appellant's Aff. 1l2. Until 
she obtained her records totally by coincidence, she would not 
have dreamed Social Services would have availed itself of her 
incapacity* 
Nonetheless, appellant's failure to discover her claims 
sooner was not from a lack of diligence. She inquired of Social 
Services through its various agents over thirty times regarding 
the adoption and her consent. Social Services repeatedly told 
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her it could give her no information regarding the adoption or 
her son. 
The District Court found she could have obtained her medical 
records and thus had constructive notice of her claims. Record 
on Appeal, pg. 390. But appellant reasonably believed her 
records had been destroyed. Appellant desired to be responsible 
for the costs of her own and her son's care so on or about July 
7, 1969, she asked the hospital to provide her with her records 
so she could pay for the costs she had incurred. Appellant's 
Aff. i|l3, Record on Appeal pg. 289. The hospital responded as 
follows: 
Since the records of our no information 
maternity patients are destroyed, I can only 
send you an estimated amount. 
Appellant's Aff. fl4, Record on Appeal pg. 289. 
From the Hospital's reply, appellant reasonably assumed her 
records had been destroyed and she could have no access to them. 
Appellant's Aff. tl5, Record on Appeal pg. 289. Over 23 years 
after the birth of her son, appellant and her son were reunited. 
Appellant's Aff. ^16, Record on Appeal pg. 289. Appellant 
desired to obtain her son's medical records and requested them 
from the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990. Appellant's Aff. 1l7, 
Record on Appeal pg. 289. In response to appellant's request, on 
or about May 29, 1990, the Hospital gave her copies not of her 
son's records as she had requested but of her own records, which 
she reasonably had assumed were destroyed. Appellant's Aff. 1l8, 
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Record on Appeal pg. 289. Appellant then learned for the first 
time she had been drugged with Thorazine during her entire 
Hospital stay. Appellant's Aff. 1l9, Record on Appeal pg. 290. 
Social Services never had given appellant a copy of the 
release. After she obtained her medical records, in or about 
August, 1990, appellant visited Social Services to determine what 
documentation, if any, Social Services had of the authority it 
claimed in placing appellant's son for adoption. Appellant then 
obtained from Social Services a copy of the release. Plaintiff's 
Aff. f20, Record on Appeal pg. 290- By matching the release with 
her hospital records, appellant discovered for the first time 
Social Services had obtained her ostensible consent while 
appellant was incapacitated from the effects of the drug 
Thorazine. Appellant later learned that Social Services was 
aware of appellant's sedation and affected condition when it 
obtained her consent. Plaintiff's Aff. f20, Record on Appeal, 
pg. 290; Carling Aff. 1f6 & 9, Record on Appeal, pg. 308. 
Once plaintiff was aware of her claim she pursued it through 
every level of Church judiciary. Plaintiff's Aff. ^22, Record on 
Appeal, pg. 290. She issued volumes of correspondence. 
Plaintiff's Aff. 123, Record on Appeal, pp. 290-91. She sought 
audience with Church authority at every available level, 
including her Bishop, her Stake President, her Regional 
Representative, the Area President and, finally, the Presiding 
Bishop. Plaintiff's Aff. 124, Record on Appeal, pg. 291. 
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Appellant pleaded her case endless times in countless forums. 
Then painfully, reluctantly, appellant last resorted to this 
lawsuit, having exhausted all other remedies. Plaintiff's Aff. 
1(25, Record on Appeal, pg. 291. Appellant never dreamed she would 
have to sue the Church she Loves and trusts. She never dreamed 
the civil courts would provide the only patient and fair minded 
forum to hear her claims. Finally, after more than two years of 
asserting her rights constantly and relentlessly, she found her 
neutral arbiter in this Court. To say appellant delayed 
asserting her claim is false and unfair. 
Because appellant was unaware of and reasonably could not 
have discovered the facts underlying her causes of action, the 
discovery rule applies to toll the applicable statutes of 
limitation. That rule applies in three alternative contexts 
where: 1) the legislature has adopted the rule by statute; 2) 
application of the general statute of limitation rule would be 
irrational or unjust; and 3) there is proof of concealment or 
misleading by the defendant. Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 
872 (Utah 1990). Here: 1) it would be irrational or unjust to 
consider appellant's causes of action to have accrued at the time 
she lost her son; and 2) the limitation period is tolled by the 
defendants' concealment. 
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1. Rational and just application of the statutes. 
To determine whether it is rational and just to bar the 
claim, the Court balances "the hardship the statute of 
limitations would impose on the appellant in the circumstances of 
the case outweighed any prejudice to the defendant from 
difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time." Klinaer. 
791 P.2d at 872 citing Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. Here, considering 
plaintiff's cause of action to have accrued when Social Services 
took her child, instead of when she discovered their misconduct, 
is irrational and unjust and will work an ultimate hardship on 
her. In contrast, it will cause no prejudice to appellees. 
To consider appellant's actions to have accrued when she 
executed the release will impose on appellant complete hardship; 
it will dispose of her claims before they accrued. Appellant had 
no knowledge or notice of defendants' misconduct. She knew she 
no longer had her son. She knew of her grief. She knew of her 
bewilderment and despair. Defendants blithely claim that if 
appellant was so put upon she should have asserted herself to 
undo the deal. What falsehood! All appellant's sorrow and 
confusion would not persuade Social Services to let appellant 
void the contract. Carling Aff. Ull, Record on Appeal, pg. 309. 
She had no claim to bring until she learned she had given her 
consent while incapacitated. 
In contrast, to consider appellant's claims to have accrued 
when appellant became aware of appellee's misconduct will cause 
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defendants no prejudice. Appellees' arguments of prejudice are 
unsupported by and contrary to the uncontroverted facts. In 
Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987) the court 
rejected defendant's claim of prejudice because he showed no 
facts to support his argument that the delay between the subject 
events and plaintiff's claim made him unable to contact witnesses 
and gather documents. Borland, 733 P.2d at 147. Here, as in 
Borland, appellees offer just bare, unsupported arguments of 
prejudice unsupported by the record. 
Appellant and Mrs. Carling are the only witnesses to 
appellant's execution of the release. Mrs. Carling recalls the 
transaction and surrounding events remarkably clearly. Mrs. 
Carling made a contemporaneous record of the events. All 
relevant documents are intact; none have been lost or destroyed. 
A defendant cannot establish he was prejudiced by having to 
defend against a stale claim where his problems of proof 
occasioned by the delay are no greater than the plaintiff's. 
Myers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981); Mauahn v. SW 
Servicing. Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387-8 (10th Cir. 1985). The 
present lawsuit is preserved well and can be presented well. To 
allow it will give appellant her rightful day in court and will 
do defendants no injustice. 
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation 
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the 
legal cause of her injury. The date of her physical injury is 
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irrelevant. Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, and she 
filed timely in May, 1993. 
2. Appellees' concealment. 
Limitation periods are tolled while a defendant conceals a 
claim. Berenda v. Lanaford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996). The rule 
applies on appellant's prima facie showing of fraudulent 
concealment and demonstration that given the defendant's actions 
a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered her claim 
earlier. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53. "The application of this 
legal rule to any particular set of facts is necessarily a matter 
left to trial courts and finders of fact." 
Here, Gladys S. Carling, the Social Services employee who 
took appellant's consent, was aware appellant was sedated and 
affected when she obtained appellant's release. Carling Aff. 16-
9, Record on Appeal, pg. 308. Mrs. Carling officially recorded 
her perception that appellant was sedated and affected so Social 
Services shared Mrs. Carling's awareness. Carling Aff. 1(8-9, 
Record on Appeal, pg- 308. Mrs. Carling also acted as the only 
witness to~the transaction and as notary. Carling Aff. Hi, 
Record on Appeal, pg. 306. Social Services maintained to itself 
sole control of the transaction and of all information 
surrounding the transaction. Appellant had no memory of executing 
the release. 
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After the adoption, appellant diligently inquired of Social 
Services regarding the adoption and her son. Plaintiff's Aff. 
1|26, Record on Appeal, pg. 291. For example, four days after the 
birth, appellant and her mother visited Social Services to 
inquire about appellant's son and the adoption. Social Services 
failed to inform appellant of her incapacity. Plaintiff's Aff. 
1(27, Record on Appeal, pg. 291. Appellant inquired of Social 
Services through its various agents approximately thirty more 
times. Plaintiff's Aff. 128, Record on Appeal, pg. 291. 
Although aware of appellant's flawed consent, Social Services 
told appellant they could give her no other information regarding 
the adoption or her son. Social Services would not give 
appellant a copy of the release until August, 1990, after 
appellant confronted Social Services with the medical records 
which revealed her incapacity. Plaintiff's Aff. 120, Record on 
Appeal, pg. 290. 
By shunning appellant's inquiry, defendants falsely 
represented to appellant that the release was legally sound or 
that defendants lacked any knowledge of its unsoundness. 
Appellant relied on appellees' representations and concealment 
and failed to discover her claims earlier. Because of appellees' 
concealment appellant lost the support, love and companionship of 
her first born son. The damage caused by defendants' concealment 
would be complete if defendants now can plead statutes of 
limitation as a bar to appellant's right to redress her injuries. 
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But they cannot. Defendants' concealment tolls those statutes of 
limitation and allows appellant's claims. 
The Utah Supreme Court accepted appellant's position on 
nearly identical facts. Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp, 784 
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989). In Chapman. an infant child suffered 
personal injury from a physician's malpractice. Id. at 1183. 
The child's parents confronted the physician but the physician 
told them he had tested the child and determined the injury was 
not caused by wrongdoing. In truth, the physician had conducted 
no tests to determine the cause of the child's injuries. Id. 
The parents' trust and confidence in the physician negated their 
suspicion. Id. Nine years after the child's injury the parents 
obtained the child's medical records and discovered for the first 
time the injury was caused by the physician's misconduct. 
Although the parents knew of the child's physical injury in 1973, 
they were not aware of the legal injury until 1984 when they 
finally obtained the child's medical records. Id. The statute 
of limitation began to run in 1984 when the parents discovered 
the legal cause of the child's injury. Chapman, 784 P.2d at 
1184-85. Here, as in Chapman, appellant's claims did not accrue 
until she was free of defendants' concealment and aware of her 
injury's legal cause. 
Given the appellees' actions appellant acted reasonably and 
could not have discovered her claim earlier. See Berenda. 914 
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P.2d at 53. Appellant inquired diligently of Social Services. 
She reasonably believed her medical records had been destroyed. 
But there is more. Appellant placed trust and confidence in 
Social Services as an office of the Church and Social Services 
had extraordinary influence over her. Plaintiff's Aff. fl2, 
Record on Appeal, pg. 2 89. Where one party has extraordinary 
influence in a transaction, it is presumed that the undue 
influence lingers "if the causative elements giving rise to the 
initial undue influence are such that the undue influence was 
likely to have continued." Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 
1232 (Utah 1983)(undue influence in claimed ratification of a 
contract). 
For example, in Ferguson v. Jeanes. a religious leader 
persuaded a devotee to give him money to form a partnership with 
him. Ferguson v. Jeanes, 619 P.2d 369, 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1980)(ratification). The leader failed to pay the devotee as 
agreed but continually reassured the devotee the payments would 
be forthcoming. The devotee trusted the leader's assurances so 
she delayed to investigate her possible legal rights against the 
leader. 
The court found the devotee's agreement was caused by the 
leader's undue influence achieved in the name of the religion. 
The same trust and confidence which caused the devotee first to 
enter the contract also caused her delay in pursuing her legal 
rights. Ferguson, 619 P.2d at 374. 
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Here, appellant had trust and confidence in Social Services 
as an agent of the Church to which she was and remains devoted. 
Plaintiff's Aff. fl2, Record on Appeal, pg. 289. Although she 
was hurt and confused, her faith in the Church removed any 
suspicion of wrongdoing. It never would have occurred to her 
that her Church would avail itself of her incapacity. Social 
Services' extraordinary influence overcame the instinct she 
otherwise would have had to inquire into any wrongdoing. That 
influence never waned. Appellants had a duty to disclose to 
appellant material facts regarding the transaction or facts 
exclusively in defendants' control. But in spite of ample 
opportunity, defendants' concealed from defendant that the 
release was flawed. She did not and could not know of her claims 
until fate gave her the knowledge Social Services would not. 
Against the background of appellees' concealment, appellant 
reasonably could not have discovered her claims any sooner. 
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation period 
began to run when appellant first was able to discover the legal 
cause of her injury. Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, 
and she filed timely in May, 1993. 
B. The District Court granted summary judgment although there 
are material facts in dispute. 
A motion for summary judgment is in effect a 
demurrer to the claims of the plaintiff, saying: 
assuming they are true, no right to recover is shown. 
It is regarded as a harsh measure which the courts are 
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reluctant to sanction because it deprives the adverse 
party of an opportunity to present the evidence 
concerning her grievance for adjudication. For this 
reason, plaintiff's contentions must be considered in 
the light most to her advantage and all doubts resolved 
in favor of permitting her to go to trial; and only if 
when the whole matter is so viewed, she could 
nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, should 
the motion be granted. 
Samms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344, 345 (Utah 1961). "Such close 
calls are for juries, not judges, to make." Berenda, 914 P.2d 
45, 54 (Utah 1996) citing Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 
784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989). 
The District Court's granted summary judgment in the face of 
numerous core issues which properly are questions of fact for the 
jury and as to each of which appellant offered substantial 
evidence to place the issue in dispute, as follows: 
1. When appellant knew or with reasonable diligence should 
have known of the facts underlying her causes of action so to 
commence running of the statute of limitations. See, e.g.. 
Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996); Mauahan v. SW 
Servicing. Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387-88 (1985). Appellant's Aff. 
11 3, 7, 8, 13-15 & 20. Record on Appeal, pp. 287-90; Carling 
Aff. 11 A-10, Record on Appeal, pp. 306-08. 
2. The point at which appellant reasonably should have 
known that she had suffered a legal injury so to commence running 
of the limitation period. See, e.g.. Merkley v. Beaslin. 778 
P.2d 16, 18 (Utah )(interpreting Utah Code Ann. 78-27-14)(lawyer 
malpractice); Andreini v. Hultgren. 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 
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1993)(medical malpractice); Lawhon v, L.B.J. Institutional 
SupplY, 765 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Ariz. App. 1988). Appellant's Aff. 
11 3, 7, 8, 13-15 Sc 20, Record on Appeal, pp. 287-90. 
3. The reasonableness of appellant's efforts to discover 
her legal injury. See, e.g., Araann v. Clover Club Foods, 857 
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Appellant's Aff. 11 12-28, 
Record on Appeal, pp. 289-292; Carling Aff. 11 1 & 4-9, Record 
on Appeal, pp. 306-08. 
4. Whether appellees' concealment of her claims tolled 
statutes of limitations. See, e.g.. Berenda v. Laugford, 914 
P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996)("application of this legal rule to any 
particular set of facts is necessarily a matter left to trial 
courts and finders of fact"). Carling Aff. 1 & 7-9, Record on 
Appeal, pp. 306-08; Appellant's Aff. 3, 8 & 12-28, Record on 
Appeal, pp. 287-292. 
5. The existence of a confidential relationship. See 
VonHake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). Appellant's 
Aff. 11 3 & 12, Record on Appeal, pg. 287-89. 
The District Court improperly denied appellant her day in 
court to resolve those factual issues. Paragraphs 2 through 7 of 
the District Court's summary judgment order must be reversed. 
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C. The summary judgment order erroneously relies on 
evidence of issues not properly before the court. 
Issues of appellant's contractual capacity and of the 
release's validity or invalidity were not before the District 
Court. The issues were not raised in appellee's motion for 
summary judgment or any other motion. Nonetheless, appellees 
began to offer evidence of appellant's capacity as follows: 
MR. NELSON: ... Now, an important point on that 
release -- the issue here on the underlying merits is, 
of course, whether the relinquishment was voluntary and 
whether she had capacity, she did know what she was 
doing. In fact, she wrote: 
In the event of the adoptive parents 
being unable to care, protect or otherwise 
perform all the other responsibilities, I 
desire the agency to place the child back in 
my custody. 
And she wrote that, and she signed it. And so it 
is pretty clear --
THE COURT: What do have that's her handwriting? 
MR. NELSON: No denial ... 
In apparent anticipation of appellant's objection, 
appellees' counsel then explained to the District Court that 
appellant's contractual capacity was not properly before the 
court, as follows: 
MR. NELSON: ... We need not resolve today --it 
is not a material fact -- whether plaintiff was, in 
fact, incapacitated. All of our defenses make that 
immaterial, that question immaterial. 
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Record on Appeal, pg. 386. Nonetheless, the District Court 
apparently based its ruling on that issue. The District Court 
stated: 
THE COURT: ... That Amended Complaint sets forth 
four causes of action: Negligence, constructive fraud, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach 
of contract. I suppose there were --if you get in the 
contract area -- and that's principally the reason I've 
vacated my earlier ruling and wanted to look again at 
the validity or invalidity of the consent. 
Record on Appeal, pg. 390. The validity or invalidity of 
appellant's consent was not properly before the District Court 
and cannot be the basis for its ruling. 
The issue of appellant's capacity and the release's validity 
are questions of fact for the jury. When that issue is properly 
considered, appellant will offer fact witness testimony, expert 
witness testimony, and documentary and other evidence so the 
District Court will be properly informed. 
The evidence which appellees improperly submitted and then 
withdrew on which the District Court apparently relied reveals 
the issue is disputed and could not be resolved on summary 
j udgment. 
Appellees offered as evidence of appellant's capacity the 
release and a handwritten addendum to the release. But to the 
contrary, the release and its addendum reveals appellant's 
incapacity. The addendum states as follows: 
In the event of the adoptive parents being unable 
to care, protect or otherwise perform all the other 
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responsibilities, I desire the agency to place the 
child back in my custody. 
Record on Appeal, pg. 295-96. 
The record reveals appellant was a 23 year old graduate 
student at the relevant time. It is reasonable to infer she was 
well educated and articulate. But the addendum is incoherently 
written. It is grammatically incorrect. Although one may infer 
several meanings from a generous reading of it, taken literally 
it is nonsense. Also, the addendum speaks impersonally of "the 
child", not of "my son" or "my child" as a newborn's mother would 
speak. 
Strangely, the release would allow for a single parent to 
adopt appellant's child although the Church's counsel to 
appellant was that she would ruin her child's life if she raised 
it alone. Record on Appeal, pg. 295. In her right mind, 
appellant would not have executed a release which allowed another 
what it deprived of her. Finally, appellant was drugged so 
heavily she has no memory of executing the release. 
From those facts of record, it is not reasonable to infer 
appellant had adequate capacity to enter the release and 
relinquish her child for adoption. At the very least, the matter 
of appellant's capacity remains in dispute as a question of fact 
for the District Court to consider on proper proof. Based on the 
inappropriate finding that appellant had contractual capacity, 
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paragraphs 2 through 7 of the summary judgment order are flawed 
and cannot endure. 
II. THE ORDER DISALLOWING THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Appellant moved for permission to file a second amended 
complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true names as 
learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement of 
plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of 
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better. 
Appellant's amended complaint and proposed second amended 
complaint are included in the appendix to this brief. 
Inexplicably, the District Court disallowed the amendment as 
follows: 
Based on [the District Court's February 20, 1996, 
minute entry ruling!, the Court now hereby orders that 
plaintiff's motion is denied for the reasons that the 
proposed amendment (1) alleges no actionable misconduct 
by the additional parties; (2) identifies no specific 
policies to be at issue; and (3) adds nothing of 
substance to the case. 
Record on Appeal, pp. 244-45. 
A. Amendments should be allowed liberally. 
To properly frame the issues, to allow the parties a fair 
opportunity to present their claims, and to assure that trials 
conform to and include all relevant facts and applicable law, 
courts liberally should allow the parties to amend their 
pleadings. 
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... [A] party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of Court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 
The rule in this State has always been to allow 
amendments freely where justice requires, and 
especially this is true before trial. 
Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1971). 
B. The amendment should be allowed to substitute certain doe 
defendants' names as learned in discovery. 
After plaintiff filed an amended complaint, counsel engaged 
in several rounds of very efficient, cooperative informal 
discovery in which defendants' counsel schooled plaintiff's 
counsel in the defendants' true roles and relationships. 
Plaintiff fashioned her second amended complaint based on the 
information defendants provided regarding those parties 
identities. Based on that information she substituted certain 
doe defendants' true names. Record on Appeal, pg. 182-94 & 158-
60. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a)(2) allows: 
(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a 
party does not know the name of an adverse party, he 
may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon 
such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or 
proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true 
name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading 
or proceeding must be amended accordingly. 
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When appellant learned the doe defendants' true names, Rule 
9(a)(2) mandated she amend her complaint to name them. The 
District Court erred in disallowing that mandatory amendment. 
C. The amendment would not prejudice the appellees. 
A prime consideration in determining whether an 
amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of and 
opportunity for the opposing party to meet the newly 
raised matter. 
Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981). 
Here, the amendment's factual matter was based on 
information defendants provided in discovery so they must already 
have notice of it. The amendment added no new causes of action. 
The appellees cannot complain they would have an inadequate 
opportunity "to meet the newly raised matter," factual or legal. 
Although the present matter had aged chronologically at the 
time of appellant's motion, it had not matured to match its age. 
With or without the second amendment the case was at its 
procedural inception. There has been no formal discovery and 
minimal trial preparation. The only advance beyond appellant's 
amended complaint was appellees' answer, which appellees could 
have conformed to the second amended complaint without 
substantial expense. The appellees cannot complain to be 
prejudiced by a substitute complaint when the case is still at 
the pleading stage. 
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The District Court should have allowed the amendment. It's 
order denying appellant permission to amend is in error and 
should be reversed. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
For all these years, defendants have relied on an adoption 
release which Social Services itself believed to be flawed. How 
surprised can the appellees be that when the truth they had 
suppressed finally came out they were made to answer for their 
wrongdoing? 
Appellant's cause of action accrued and the limitation 
period began to run when appellant first was able to discover the 
legal cause of her injury. The date of her physical injury is 
irrelevant. Against the background of appellees' concealment, 
appellant reasonably could not have discovered her claims any 
sooner. Appellant's action accrued in August, 1990, and she 
filed timely in May, 1993. 
The District Court improperly denied appellant her day in 
court to resolve factual issues necessary to a proper ruling. 
It's improper determination of those fact issues included 
inappropriate findings on issues not properly before the District 
Court. Paragraphs 2 through 7 of the District Court's summary 
judgment order must be reversed. 
The District Court also disallowed a second amended 
complaint to substitute certain doe defendants' true names as 
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learned in discovery, to present a more clear statement of 
plaintiff's case and to provide appellees better notice of 
appellant's claims to allow appellees to respond better. The 
District Court should have allowed the amendment. The District 
Court's order denying appellant permission to amend is in error 
and should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted on December 5, 1996 
RicMrd G. Hackwell 
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I certify that on December 5, 1996, two correct copies of 
the appellant's brief were served by mail to the following: 
David M. McConkie, Esq. 
Thomas D. Walk, Esq. 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
Dated December 5, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25(3) 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-23(2) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF APPELLEES' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT ORDER 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
FEB 20, 1996 MINUTE ENTRY RULING DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO FILE HER SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-25 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions <$= 
§ 33 et seq. 58(2). 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instru-
ment in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchan-
dise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open 
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections 
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 110. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introduc-
tory paragraph, substituted "An action may be 
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-
tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) and (3); 
and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions, 
§ 76-10-925. 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Assigned cause of action. 
Breach of fiduciary duty. 
Conflict of laws. 
Damage of private property for public use. 
Discovery rule. 
Discovery rule. 
Divorce actions. 
Equitable actions. 
Excessive freight charges. 
Extension of period. 
Federal civil rights actions. 
Indemnity or guaranty bond. 
Judgment lien. 
Land contract. 
Malpractice. 
Mortgages. 
Negligent employment. 
Nuisances. 
Open account. 
Oral contract. 
Oral modification of written contract. 
Other claims for relief. 
— Federal claim. 
— Negligence. 
— Promissory estoppel. 
Paternity action. 
Overpayment. 
Personal injuries. 
Pleading and proof. 
Product liability. 
Purpose of section. 
Quieting title. 
Recovery of payments under note. 
Reformation of instrument. 
Relation back of complaints. 
Relief not otherwise provided for. 
Restraining actions. 
Running of statute. 
— Payment of settlement obligation. 
Stockholder's duty to pay taxes. 
Taking for public use. 
Tax paid under protest. 
Tolling. 
— Class actions. 
Torts. 
Trustees. 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-23 
violate the automatic stay provisions of the 
federal bankruptcy code, because a renewal is 
not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the 
original judgment. Barber v. Emporium Part-
nership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 1990). 
Stipulations. 
Parties to contract may stipulate for period of 
limitations shorter than that fixed by statute of 
limitations. Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284, 184 P. 
821 (1919). 
Support or maintenance. 
The eight-year statute of limitations applies 
to past due unpaid installments for alimony or 
support of minor children, and therefore execu-
tion may issue only for the arrearages accumu-
lated within a period of eight years. Seeley v. 
Park, 532 P2d 684 (Utah 1975). 
A Utah action brought in 1978 to enforce a 
1975 Ohio action for support arrearages, which 
also included a 1967 Ohio action for support 
arrearages, was timely filed under this section. 
Logan v. Schneider, 609 P.2d 943 (Utah 1980). 
Wife could apply her time-barred claim for 
child support arrearages to offset her husband's 
Hen on the marital home, and then affirma-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and 
Separation §§ 1073,1074; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judg-
ments § 897 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 27C C.J.S Divorce §§ 684 to 693; 50 
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 854, 871; 67AC.J.S. Par-
ent and Child §§ 73 to 89. 
A.L.R. — Statute of limitations: effect of 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-23; L. 1984, ch. 16, § 2; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 109; 1996, ch. 210, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment by ch. 79, effective April 29, 1996, in the 
introductory paragraph, substituted "An action 
may be brought within" for "Within"; deleted 
"An action" at the beginning of Subsections (1) 
to (3); and in Subsections (1) and (2), substi-
tuted a semicolon for a period. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 210, effective 
tively assert her claim for past due support that 
had accrued within the limitations period. 
Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Tolling. 
In action by administrator, indebtedness cre-
ated by check was held to be barred, and 
statute was not tolled by unauthorized acts of 
plaintiff. Bingham v. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75 
Utah 149, 283 P. 1055 (1929). 
Action to renew a judgment brought more 
than eight years after the date of entry of the 
original judgment was barred by this section 
even though defendant had signed a written 
agreement acknowledging the obligation and 
had made some payments thereon less than 
eight years before commencement of the action. 
The common-law rule which tolled the limita-
tion period in case of acknowledgment or part 
payment is limited by § 78-12-44 so that it now 
applies only to contract actions. Yergensen v. 
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965). 
Cited in Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
delay in appointing administrator or other rep-
resentative on cause of action accruing at or 
after death of person in whose favor it would 
have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141. 
Key Numbers. — Divorce «» 311; Judgment 
s=> 910, 934; Parent and Child <®=> 3.3(4), 3.4(2). 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3) 
regarding distribution of criminal proceeds to 
victims. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and Greneral 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
statute of limitations, § 78-15-3. 
Promise to pay extends period, § 78-12-44. 
Three-year limitation period for action on 
written insurance contract, § 31A-21-313. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real prop-
erty - Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instru-
ment in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
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David M. McConkie (A2154) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NANCY G. SAFSTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; THE CORPORATION OF 
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah 
corporation, and DOES 1-10, 
ORDER 
Case No. 930902822PI 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and separate Motion for Protective Order, 
Sanctions, and to Quash Subpoena came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Kenneth 
Rigtrup on May 13, 1996. Defendants were represented by Merrill F. Nelson and David M. 
McConkie; plaintiff was represented by Richard G. Hackweil. The Court, having considered the 
written memoranda and oral arguments of the parties, now hereby enters the following order: 
O C . A ; ^ 
1. The statute of limitations and statute of repose in the Health Care Malpractice Act, 
U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1), do not apply because the taking of plaintiffs adoption consent does not 
constitute provision of medical care to the plaintiff. 
2. Plaintiffs tort claims are barred by the statute of limitations in U.CA. § 78-12-
25(3), and plaintiffs contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations in U.CA. § 78-12-23(2). 
3. Plaintiff knew of her injury, the loss of her child, upon leaving the hospital in 1967, 
and her cause of action accrued at that time. 
4. The administration of thorazinc was reasonably discoverable by plaintiff within the 
limitations period following her release from the hospital, but plaintiff failed to take reasonable 
steps to discover the cause of her alleged incapacity. 
5. Plaintiff was on notice to inquire about the circumstances surrounding the taking 
of her consent because, as she alleged, "not a day has passed since January, 1967, that plaintiff 
has not felt the deep heartache and void of the loss of her child and the loss of the joys of 
motherhood." 
6. Plaintiffs action is time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations, and her 
Amended Complaint is accordingly dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
8. With the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants' separate 
Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions, and to Quash Subpoena is rendered moot. 
-2-
:O0!>&» 
DATED this J3_ day o M « * , 1996. 
^M^v 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed the foregoing ORDER this-f^'day of June, 
1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Richard G. Hackwell 
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
T vu: t-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Page 1 
NANCY J. SAFSTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
L O.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
ET AL., 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 930902822 
HEARING, 5-13-96 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day 
of May, 1996, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came 
on for hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake 
County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: RICHARD G. HACKWELL 
Attorney at Law 
For the Defendant: MERRILL F. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
1 or otherwise perform all the other 
2 responsibilities, I desire the agency 
3 to place the child back in my 
4 custody." 
5 Ana she wrote that, and she signed it. 
6 And so it is pretty clear --
7 THE COURT: what do we have that that's 
8 her handwriting? 
9 MR. NELSON: No denial. We have alleged 
10 that that's her handwriting, and they haven't 
11 disputed that. And so, Your Honor, the child was 
12 placed for adoption. And two days after the 
13 placement the Plaintiff alleges that she came with 
14 her mother to the agency inquiring what happened to 
15 her child, presumably asking about getting ner child 
16 back. And she alleges now that there were 30 more 
17 other such visits shortly after that; 30 times she 
18 came and expressed her remorse, her grief, her 
19 regret, stating that that's not what she wanted to 
20 do, that it was against what she wanted and she 
21 wanted her baby back; 30 more times she did that. 
22 We need not resolve today - it is not a 
23 material fact - whether the Plaintiff was, in fact, 
24 incapacitated. All of our defenses make that fact 
25 immaterial, that question immaterial. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Nancy J. Safsten versus 
3 St. Benedict's Hospital, et al., 930902822. 
4 May we have your appearances for the 
5 record, please? 
6 MR. NELSON: Merrill Nelson and David 
7 McConkie here for the Defendants. 
8 MR. HACKWELL: Richard Hackwell for 
9 Plaintiff Nancy Safsten. 
10 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
11 MR. NELSON: Your Honor, we have two 
12 separate motions before you. I don't know the order 
13 the Court prefers. What I plan to do is go through 
14 the motion for summary judgement first. 
15 THE COURT: Thar S fine. 
16 MR. NELSON: And then we can fall back on 
17 the other motion as necessary. 
18 THE COURT: All right. 
19 MR. NELSON: Your Honor, this is a 
20 summary judgement motion. And the basis for it, of 
21 course, is that there are no material issues of fact 
22 and all of the Defendants are entitled to judgements 
23 as a matter of law. 
24 The Plaintiff, in responding to our 
25 motion for summary judgement, failed to specifically 
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1 We have two categories of defenses on our 
2 summary judgement motion, and I group them as time 
3 defenses and then substantive defenses. Under the 
4 first category of time defenses, we've alleged and 
5 demonstrated that the medical malpractice statute of 
6 limitations applies to this case. That's a two-year 
7 statute that runs from discovery ~ 
8 THE COURT: My ruling prior was that i t 
9 did not apply because the social worker was not 
10 rendering health care, and that was the basis of my 
n conclusion before and would still be the same. 
12 MR. NELSON: it would be the same 
13 ruling? 
14 THE COURT: Sure. 
15 MR. NELSON: Very well. I won't spend 
16 time on that then. 
17 We'll move on to the other statutes of 
18 limitations. The Plaintiff has not contested those 
19 statutes. The tort claims - the three tort claims 
20 would all be governed by the general - the four-year 
21 catchall statute of limitations, and the contract 
22 claim would be governed by the six-year statute for a 
23 written contract. 
24 All of those claims accrue and the 
25 statutes begin to run with the existence of the claim 
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1 controvert any of our alleged facts; therefore, they 
2 are deemed admitted for purposes of this motion. 
3 Just briefly, those facts are that 
4 approximately 30 years ago in 1967 the Plaintiff was 
5 a single woman of about 21 years. She approached--
6 she contacted L.D.S. Social Services for assistance 
7 in placing her child for adoption. And the agency 
8 provided several weeks of counseling. She decided to 
9 place her child for adoption. She went into the 
10 hospital, delivered the child during that process— 
u or following the birth, she was administered pain 
12 killer, some kind of medication for the pain. And 
13 two days after the birth, our agent, Mrs. Carlene 
14 (phonetic), went to the hospital and received the 
15 Plaintiffs release relinquishing the child to L.D.S. 
16 Social Services for placement 
17 Now, an important point on that release 
18 - the issue here on the underlying merits is, of 
19 course, whether the relinquishment was voluntary and 
20 whether she had capacity. The Plaintiffs own 
21 handwritten statement on the release indicates that 
22 she was - she did have capacity, she did know what 
23 she was doing. In fact she wrote: 
24 "In the event ot the adoptive 
25 parents being unable to care, protect 
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1 as soon as there is an injury and the Plaintiff has 
2 someone to sue for that injury. All of those 
3 statutes begin to run without regard to the 
4 discovery. The Utah law makes clear that ignorance 
5 of a cause of action does not toll the running of the 
6 statute. 
7 And so all of those statutes began to run 
8 in 1967 when the Plaintiff knew of her injury, which 
9 she has not disputed. Her injury was the loss of her 
10 child; not disputed. 
u She also knew the cause of that injury. 
12 She knew that the child had been relinquished for 
13 adoption to L.D.S. Social Services. So she knew 
14 where the child was, she knew who to sue and she had 
15 a cause of action. She had a legal theory: Under 
16 duress. If the placement truly was against her will, 
17 then she had a cause of action for duress back in 
18 1967. And all of her four claims would be barred 
19 long before 1993 when she filed this action. 
20 Now, the Plaintiff makes the argument 
21 that the discovery rule should apply. And under that 
22 discovery rule, tfie causes of action would not begin 
23 to run, or the time would not begin to run, until the 
24 Plaintiff actually discovered the cause of acticwi. 
25 The problem with this defense, though, Your Honor, is 
Page 6 
P A D f T H X I W A V D D D OA1 M < CA*A 
Condenselt 
Page 7 
1 the Plaintiff's continually focusing on discovery of 
2 the medication, which is a red herring in the 
3 nomenclature. It is a red herring because the real 
4 issue is when she discovered her duress claim, and 
5 the duress claim was not tolled pending discovery of 
6 the incapacity claim based on the medication. And so 
7 even if the discovery rule is applied under the 
8 exceptional circumstances theory, she still 
9 discovered her injury, the cause of her injury and 
10 identified a person sne could sue back in 1967. 
11 Now, of course, we've raised some other 
12 defenses, basic defenses, of why the discovery rule 
13 wouldn't even apply. The exceptional circumstances 
14 discovery rule was not adopted oy the Utah Supreme 
15 Court until 1981, and the Plaintiff's claim was 
16 barred clear back in the '60s or '70 's at the latest, 
17 long before this discovery rule was adopted; 
18 therefore, the Defendants have a vested defense that 
19 cannot be divested by later adoption of the discovery 
20 rule. So the discovery rule cannot apply in this 
21 case. 
22 The other barrier to application of the 
23 discovery rule is the threshoia requirement that 
24 there be ignorance of any other cause of action. By 
25
_ ^ f i ^ i o n , ^ the Plaintiff knows of some cause of 
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1 action, then there is some discovery there, and 
2 cannot olead discovery of a later tneory. And so 
3 here, o f course, as we ve indicated, the Plaintiff 
4 was aware in 1967 of a cause of action for duress or 
5 rescission of the release based on duress that could 
6 have been filed against the agency. 
7 An illustrative case that we've cited in 
8 the memorandum is the Pritzlaff case. It was an 
9 interesting case in which a woman had a sexual 
10 relationship with a priest and went through that 
11 relationship for many years and discovered going 
12 through counseling that that relationship was the 
13 cause of some mental and emotional damage. And so 
14 she filed her action, claiming "I've just discovered, 
15 my counselor has just told me, that my emotional 
16 condition is caused by that sexual relationship." 
17 And the Court saidj 'TJO, your action is time-barred. 
18 Even though you did not discover until many years 
19 later the connection between your condition and the 
20 relationship, you still knew back when the 
121 relationship ended. You had a cause of action back 
22 then for battery or whatever else, if as you allege, 
23 the contact was non-consensual.M 
24 And so that is a good illustrative case. 
25 The Court has referred to its prior 
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1 ruling. This Court has also previously ruled that 
2 based on the Plaintiffs allegations that every day 
3 since 1967 she's felt the sorrow and pain and remorse 
4 and regret of this decision. Based on that, this 
5 Court ruled: 
6 "Given thorn circumstances, 
7 Plaintiff was OG notice to make 
8 inquiry about the circumstances 
9 surrounding the taking of her 
io consent. Sne either knew or 
11 reasonably should have known of any 
12 misconduct of Defendants many more 
13 years than the three-year limitations 
14 contained in the fraud statute.11 
15 That's back when she had alleged fraud, 
16 but that is dropped But the same reasoning 
17 applies: She knew or should have known back in 1967 
18 that she had some cause of action. Based on that. 
19 knowledge of some cause of action, specifically the 
20 cause of action for duress, she cannot pled ignorance 
21 of the incapacity claim to toll the other cause of 
22 action. So those are the statute of limitations. 
23 Now, if we move on to laches, laches is 
24 an equitable defense that applies without regard to 
[25 the statute of limitations. Even if those elements 
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i for some reason are technically not satisfied, the 
2 Court can still bar the action oased on fairness and 
3 equity. It is just simply to long to wait to file a 
4 lawsuit. Based on the fact that the Plaintiff knew 
5 of a cause of action back in 1967, waiting until 1993 
6 to file her action is certainly unreasonable delay in 
7 [il'mg that action. If the Defendants were required 
8 to defend that cause of action now after all or these 
9 30 years, it would result in great prejudice to the 
10 Defendants because many of the witnesses are -
11 cannot be located or have passed on or do not 
12 remember what happened. 
13 Now, the Plaintiff says, "Well, that's no 
14 problem. We only have two witnesses, the Plaintiff 
15 and the Social Service worker, Mrs. Carlene." But 
16 that's not true. Many other witnesses would be 
17 required to establish what she intended to do at the 
18 time and her actions after that. And so we'd want to 
19 contact the biological father. He's been 
20 identified. We would want to contact her physician 
21 who ordered the medication; the nurses in the 
22 hospital who were there who viewed her condition. 
23 Wevd want to contact the Plaintiffs parents, if they 
24 are still alive. I understand one of them is not. 
25 There are many other witnesses that would have to be 
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1 located and — to see what they could remember about 
2 the Plaintiffs condition, her mental state and what 
3 she intended at the time. All of that, the 
4 difficulty of that burden of proof to the Defendants, 
5 would result in great prejudice to the Defendants; 
6 therefore, the lacnes also bars the Plaintiff s cause 
7 of action. 
8 Those are the time defenses statutes of 
9 limitations and laches. But, Your Honor, the 
io substantive defenses are just as convincing, just as 
11 persuasive, even without - even if it is not 
12 time-barred, what is the Plaintiffs injury in this 
13 case? The only alleged injury is emotional, the 
14 emotional pain. And we don't deny that there would 
15 be pain from loss of a son. That is her injury. But 
16 witn that injury, if that's her only claim - sne 
17 hasn't alleged a personal injury, no allegation of 
18 economic loss, only emotional injury. Utah law is 
19 clear that under the theories she's alleged, 
20 negligence, constructive fraud and breach of 
21 contract, emotional distress, damages cannot be 
22 recovered under those theories. Therefore, even if 
23 she prevailed under those theories, what relief would 
24 the Court grant? What relief would the Court award 
25 to this Plaintiff? There is no relief that can be 
Pag< 
1 awarded. 
2 The only theory that she's alleged in 
3 which she can recover emotional distress damages is 
4 intentional infliction of emotional distress. And an 
5 essential element of that claim is, of course, 
6 outrageous conduct We've demonstrated that that can 
7 be decided as a matter of law where it is absent. 
8 And here what was our conduct? Here, we are a 
9 licensed child placement agency, we took the 
io Plaintiffs adoption consent at ner request, nothing 
H more. That action, by definition, is not 
12 outrageous. 
13 This Court is aware of the cases that 
14 decide what is outrageous: Samms v. Eccles, 
15 subsequent cases, most of them deal with a long 
16 course of conduct in which the defendant intended and 
17 pursued and harassed and stocked a plaintiff for the 
18 purpose of causing emotional distress. There was 
19 nothing like that here. We went to the hospital two 
20 days after the birth, and at her request, we took her 
21 consent At her request, we placed the baby for 
22 adoption. That's not outrageous conduct That does 
23 not offend the common standards of decency in the 
24 community. 
25 Finally, the breach of contract. Your 
PARLTON WAY. RPR. 801-535-5464 _ _ Page ? - Pag 
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1 Honor, at this point having read through the 
2 memoranda, their response, the contract claim is in 
3 pretty much disarray. I don't know what's left of 
4 it. There is no breach of contract here. The only 
5 alleged breach is her incapacity. But that does not 
6 breach a contract. That just renders it voidable. 
7 And we have cited similar cases, for example, where a 
8 plaintiff was intoxicated at the time he sold an 
9 animal, a bull. And after it was over, he tried to 
10 get his bull back. And the Court said, "No, your 
11 remedy was to either disaffirm or confirm the 
12 contract after regaining your capacity. Because you 
13 affirmed the contract, you took no action to get your 
14 bull back, the contract is valid and enforceable. 
15 That's the same thing here. For 30 
16 years, Your Honor, the Plaintiff has affirmed this 
17 contract. She's failed to file an action to get her 
18 child back. She's instead accepted the benefits of 
19 that contract by allowing someone else to rear her 
20 child and incur those expenses, and so there is no 
21 breach of contract claim. If anything, it was 
22 voidable. She failed to disaffirm it. 
23 Now, Your Honor, that's the argument on 
24 the motion for summary judgment on the merits of the 
25 case. We can proceed to the motion for protective 
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1 Plaintiff simply was not on any notice to 
2 discover any more than that. When she approached 
3 Social Services to express to them her sorrow, the 
4 response was: "We can do nothing for you." Although 
5 they were in a confidential relationship, although 
6 they had a duty to disclose any irregularity, they 
7 being in a superior position or knowledge, their 
8 response simply was: "No, we can do nothing for 
9 you. We cannot give you a copy of the release. We 
10 cannot do anything more for you than we already 
11 have." 
12 Not until Plaintiff, by coincidence, 
13 discovered the legal cause or her injury did the 
14 facts come together for her and did she discover for 
15 the first time, "Yes, I do have a claim." Then the 
16 limitation period began. 
17 Defendants claim that the discovery rule 
18 would only apply if the Plaintiff were ignorant of 
19 any cause of action. As I've already addressed, Your 
20 Honor, she had no cause of action prior to learning 
21 of her incapacity. Plaintiff makes no claim for 
22 duress. Plaintiff's claims are solely based on the 
23 Defendants having taken her consent while she lacked 
24 the contractual capacity to give that consent. 
25 The cases which Defendants cite and those 
1 order now or we can handle it separately as you 
2 desire. 
3 THE COURT: Let Mr. Hackwell respond to 
4 that much. 
5 MR. NELSON: very well. 
6 MR. HACKWELL: Good morning, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Good morning. 
8 MR. HACKWELL: First, let me respond very 
9 briefly to the issue of inquiry notice. Certainly, 
10 Plaintiff was aware of the loss of her son. There 
11 was no issue of that. This also has — carries over 
12 to the Defendants' statements of fact. Perhaps I 
13 should address that first. 
14 I recognize that the statements of fact 
15 in Plaintiffs memorandum are a bid extraordinary. 
16 That is because, Your Honor - the flaw is not 
17 there. The flaw is in Defendants1 statement of facts 
18 in which they would have support their motions. We 
19 don't contest any of those facts. Those facts are, 
20 in truth, uncontroverted as are a number of 
21 additional facts which we - that the Plaintiff also 
22 proposes in her memorandum. However, those facts 
23 simply don't support the Defendants' legal 
24 arguments. 
25 Once again, the Defendants have focused 
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1 which Plaintiff cite, as well, state clearly that one 
2 must be ignorant or the cause of action sued on; not 
3 of any available cause of action, but a cause of 
4 action which the Plaintiff now means to avail herself 
5 of. 
6 It is a very common situation, Your 
7 Honor, in which statute of limitations in tort may 
8 have run, but the same facts could rise to a cause of 
9 action in contract, which still has a very v i a b l e -
10 which is still viable based upon continued 
u limitations, period And although the statute of 
12 limitations may have rim on other causes of action, 
13 that contract or other causes of action are still 
14 viable. Even if the Defendants' arguments were 
15 correct, that would still be the situation here. If 
16 Plaintiff has a vialable cause of action, she is 
17 entitled to bring it. 
18 A critical element, of course, of 
19 Plaintiffs claim is that the Defendants - that the 
20 prejudice to the Defendants cannot be outweighed by 
21 the hardship which the application of the statute of 
22 limitations would cause the Plaintiff. And as the 
23 cases also make clear, a mere argument of prejudice, 
24 again, doesn't suffice as evidence of any of that 
25 prejudice. 
Page 17 
upon the Plaintiffs physical injury, and there was 
no question that she was very aware of that. Her 
constant protests exist as evidence that she was 
injured. She was very aware of i t She was in deep 
pain and confusion* But, as the law makes very, very 
clear, it is not physical injury which carries the 
day. It is not the physical injury which tolls - or 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 wtiich, rather, triggers the beginning of the running 
9 of the statute of G5utations; limitations period. 
io It is the discovery of the legal injury. Here, of 
u course, the legal injury was Plaintiff s discovering 
12 that she was incapacitated while she gave that 
13 consent. 
14 All of the Plaintiffs sorrow, all of her 
15 confusion, all of her regret would not suffice to 
16 disaffirm this contract Be it void or voidable, the 
17 Plaintiff approached the Defendants a number of 
18 times, dozens of times* to raise to them the issue of 
19 her sorrow, of her confusion and her regret. But 
20 they did not recognize it, and nor, Your Honor, would 
21 a court of law. That simply does not raise to the 
22 level of an actionable claim. If that were true, 
23 every birth mother who's ever given a child up far 
24 adoption would be able to sue based on sorrow, 
25 contusion and regret. 
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1 The Defendants — there is no affidavit 
2 that they have tried to contact any of those 
3 witnesses on which they intend to rely, that they 
4 have tried to contact the natural father or the 
5 parents and have been unable to do so. As in the 
6 case of Mrs. Carlene, although the events were long 
7 ago, Mrs. Carlene*s recollection was extremely 
8 clear. She, is to say, will be a vehement, very 
9 vocal, witness in this case. There's simply no 
io prejudice for having - in Mrs. Carlene's mind for 
11 the time-lapse that occurred 
12 So, then, the Defendants' mere argument 
13 that they are prejudiced won't suffice for there is 
14 no evidence of that prejudice. 
15 In contrast, Your Honor, we are dealing 
16 with a woman who for over 20 years sought out the 
17 cause of her injury. As her affidavit states, over 
18 30 times in the few - in the months following having 
19 given up her child, she sought out to find out what 
20 was wrong. She couldn't learn anything from the 
21 medical records because, although having inquired, 
22 she reasonably believed those records had been 
23 destroyed. 
24 I believe the best evidence of how she 
25 would have and did pursue her claim is how she 
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i reacted on learning of her Thorazine-induced 
2 incapacity When she learned of that, she became a 
3 tenacious advocate of her claims She pursued her 
4 claims through every - if we take the church 
5 hierarchy as a parallel of her administrative 
6 remedies, she pursued her claim through every level 
7 of church judiciary. She pursued her claim through 
8 every church authority who would hear her claim and 
9 many who, frankly, weren't too happy to hear it; 
10 nonetheless, she pursued that remedy And as a last 
11 and very painful result, she finally brought this 
12 lawsuit; having done so fearing that her three-year 
13 statute of limitations would run She brought it 
14 within that limitations penod 
15 The Court has once ruled that she should 
16 have been on sufficient ~ that the ~ rather, the 
17 Plaintiff had notice sufficient to make her inquiry 
18 Plaintiff's response today is that she did inquire 
19 many, many tunes. And in spite of that inquiry, 
20 could not reasonably have discovered, did not 
21 discover, certainly, and could reasonably not have 
22 discovered any claim. When she did learn, we see 
23 that she inquired and then some. She inquired 
24 through every level of which she could possibly 
25 conceive to obtain relief before she finally brought 
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1 this lawsuit. 
2 The same facts then support Plaintiff's 
3 defense to her - Defendants1 claims of 
4 ratification. We believe, Your Honor, that this 
5 claim — this contract is void. The release on which 
6 Defendants rely has been void from its inception. 
7 Defendants' claims that Plaintiff relied on it and 
8 took the benefit from it, is simply specious. The 
9 fact that she allowed these parents to raise her 
10 claim -- or to raise her child, the loss of which was 
11 so painful to her, is just specious beyond one's 
12 ability almost to hear it. Plaintiff would have done 
13 anything to have reared that child. And to say that 
14 she suffered any benefit from not having reared it, 
15 is ridiculous. 
16 If this release, though, is voidable — 
17 is not void from its inception, but is voidable — 
18 there are necessary elements, once again, which 
19 Defendants' statements simply do not support. To be 
20 - t o ratify a voidable contract, it is simple -
21 simply supported by logic and simply supported by a 
22 number of cases, as well, of course. But one has to 
23 be aware, one has to have knowledge, of the flaw 
24 which would make it voidable. I mean, how could one 
25 ratify a contract of which they were — based on a 
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1 flaw which one was — Plaintiff was aware that her 
2 capacity had been taken at a time she was — or, 
3 rattier, her consent had been taken at a time she was 
4 incapacitated; not incapacitated by a pain killer, 
5 which was common to the birth process, but by a drug 
6 the entire purpose of which is to remove one's 
7 sensibilities. Until she learned that she so lacked 
8 capacity, she could not have ratified the contract 
9 because she wasn't aware of any basis on which that 
10 contract was flawed 
111 Plaintiff loves her church. She trusts 
12 it. She trusts its offices as agents of her church. 
13 It never would have occurred to her, she never would 
14 have dreamed, that Social Services would have taken 
15 her consent while there were any irregularity in that 
16 process. That trust removed from her any suspicion 
117 of that irregularity, any suspicion that she had 
18 given her consent while at a time - given her 
19 consent at a time she lacked every, every available 
20 resource to support that decision. She was 
21 spiritually traumatized, emotionally traumatized, 
22 pnysically traumatized And although that probably 
23 is common in every birth process, in this case those 
24 natural instincts, those natural emotions which one 
125 would rely on to make probably the most important 
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i decision this woman has ever made in her life were 
2 simply removed by the drug, Thorazine. 
3 The Primary Children's Hospital case is a 
4 perfect parallel, I believe, Your Honor In that 
5 case the parents, once again, knew of the - in that 
6 case, the parents of an infant child took a child to 
7 a hospital in Ogden to receive some treatment When 
8 that didn't go well, the child was moved to Primary 
9 Children's Hospital and they remedied the error One 
10 of the physicians at Primary Children's opining about 
11 his own conduct and the conduct of the Ogden hospital 
12 stated flippantly in retrospect that there is -- that 
13 she had no cause -- the parents had no legal cause of 
14 action That the child's injuries were simply 
15 unavoidable. Years later, seven or eight years 
16 later, the parents discovered that that was not the 
17 case, and that the physician had no inquiry into the 
18 underlying records. Seven or eight years later the 
19 parent, themselves, received the medical records. 
20 And the case doesn't say how or why, the case doesn't 
21 explain that delay in their receiving the medical 
22 records. The case simply says seven or eight years 
23 later they received a copy or the medical records, 
24 and then learned for the first time that they had 
25 causes of action based on serious misconduct. There, 
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1 as here, until those parents learned of that 
2 misconduct, until those parents learned of the legal 
3 causes of the injury, the statute of limitations did 
4 not begin to run then. Again, by parallel here, this 
5 Plaintiff couldn't have known of any grounds on which 
6 to ratify this contract. 
7 Finally, Your Honor, as to damages, an 
8 issue touched on in the Plaintiffs brief out not 
9 thoroughly disclosed is what to do when a void or 
10 voidable contract is such that the parties cannot be 
11 restored to their precontract position. The Court 
12 has already ruled, and I think wisely so, that it 
13 would be unwise if not impossible to restore these 
14 parties to a precontract position. The child now, of 
15 course, is 20 something years old. Fortunately, we 
16 have Utah law on point, and that is 50 West Broadway 
17 & Associates v. Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency. It 
18 is a case that is a very complex commercial 
19 transaction having to do with the American Towers and 
20 Zions Bank parking - the adjacent Zions Bank parking 
21 lot. There Plaintiff discovered a right to rescind 
22 that contract but after a multimillion dollar hotel 
23 and parking terrace and a number of other structures 
24 had already begun to be built. The Court of course 
25 ~ no choice to the contrary - ruled that that 
Pag 
1 contract could not be rescinded, but in that 
2 extraordinary situation damages would suffice as a 
3 remedy. And that is what Plaintiff claims here. 
4 Plaintiff does not claim emotional 
5 distress damages except in her claim for intentional 
6 infliction of emotional distress. I don't know where 
7 the Defendants - on what the Defendants rely to make 
8 that argument. Rather, in four conduct - in four 
9 causes of action, Plaintiff pleads as follows: For 
10 example, in her claim for constructive fraud: 
11 "Defendants' breach of duty 
12 directly and proximately caused 
13 Plaintiff damages in an amount to be 
14 proved at trial. 
15 In contract, that is simply the economic 
16 substitute for which will avail to put the parties 
17 back in their precontract position. 
18 In tort, those are these damages which 
19 are reasonably foreseeable. And as the Plaintiff has 
20 fully briefed, the measure of those damages can be 
21 analogized to the loss of one's child by wrongful 
22 death. 
23 This is an important claim, Your Honor. 
24 It is an extraordinary claim. It is an exceptionable 
25 one but very important. It is not simply the case of 
CARLTON WAY, RPR, 801-535-5464 A A A o (/ d Page 19 - Pag 
Condcnselt 
1 a birth mother who regretted her decision in 
2 retrospect. It is a case of a woman who lived with 
3 sorrow and grief which was not explained to her until 
4 years after she suffered her physical injury. But 
5 when she learned of legal injury, she acted promptly, 
6 tenaciously to remedy that claim. And she did so 
7 within three years. And she did so promptly and 
8 timely. Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Brief reply? 
10 MR. NELSON: Just briefly, Your Honor, a 
11 couple of points: I heard the Plaintiffs (sic) to 
12 concede that they did have a duress cause of action 
13 back in 1967. And to support that, Your Honor, 
14 attached to the Plaintiff's affidavit in their 
15 opposition memorandum are letters to different church 
16 authorities. And in two of those letters the 
17 Plaintiff makes the statement that she was coerced 
18 into making the release, and in another letter she 
19 says that she was forced, a forced adoption, that she 
20 was forced and coerced. That is duress. That is a 
21 cause of action for duress. If the release, if the 
22 placement, was against her will, then she had a cause 
23 of action tor duress in 1967. Ir it was not against 
24 her will, she has no damages today. She has no claim 
25 today. 
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1 authorities, all of that is quite immaterial except 
2 that it shows that she was on notice of an injury. 
3 But all of those contacts -- those contacts do not 
4 toll the statute of limitations. They do not 
5 constitute a legal claim. If she wants legal relief 
6 it must be in a court of law. There was no 
7 requirement to exhaust administrative remedies by 
8 going through the church. And the law requires her 
9 to fife a lawsuit in a court. 
10 One final point, Your Honor, is that in 
11 the Court's prior ruling, the Court did rule that the 
12 Plaintiff was on notice of a cause of action. We 
13 regard that as law of the cast. The Plaintiff has 
14 not challenged that. And we'd urge the Court to 
15 grant the motion for summary judgment on that basis, 
16 that she knew of a claim, waited too long to assert 
17 it. Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Although I read the case 
19 title as St. Benedict's Hospital, that's a product of 
20 the calendar and the computer. And the Amended 
21 Complaint is Nancy Safsten versus L.D.S. Social 
22 Services, Inc.; the Corporation of the Presiding 
23 Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
24 Saints. 
25 That Amended Complaint sets forth four 
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1 Now, Your Honor, the — this is the first 
2 I've ever heard this, that - I don't think there is 
3 any legal support for the proposition that a 
4 plaintiff - tnat a plaintiff can have a separate 
5 statute of limitations for each different legal 
6 theory, that a plaintiff can allow the statute to 
7 elapse for a contract claim and sue 30 years later 
8 for a negligence claim, for example. I don't know of 
9 any case that's ever allowed that. The statute 
10 begins to run from the beginning of any cause of 
11 action. And a cause of action is any right to bring 
12 a legal claim based on a certain set of 
13 circumstances, a transaction. Here, the cause of 
14 action accrued in '67. The two different legal 
15 theories were duress or incapacity. Even though they 
16 didn't discover the incapacity until 1990, they 
17 certainly discovered the duress in 1967, had a cause 
18 of action and at that point the statute of 
19 limitations for all of the legal theories began to 
20 run. They don't begin to run separately. 
21 The case on the damages question: The 
22 case cited by the Plaintiffs, 50 West Broadway, a 
23 case dealing with recession and no -- no viable 
24 remedy for the rescission. To begin with, the 
25 Plaintiffs (sic) here do not seek rescission. That 
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causes of action: Negligence, constructive fraud, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
breach of contract. I suppose there were - if you 
get in the contract area ~ and that's principally 
the reason that I've vacated my earlier ruling and 
wanted to look again at the validity or invalidity of 
the consent 
There were two people that would be 
affected by whether that concept was valid or not: 
10 The adoptive mother, who I understand is now 
n deceased, and adoptive father who is not joined as a 
12 party. The court recognizes that this child is not a 
13 child. He is a 29-year-old man, and he can consent 
14 to the adoption by his natural mother without consent 
15 of either adoptive parent. So, certainly, they are 
16 able to go forward with an adoption. 
17 The applicable standard is - at least 
18 which was adopted, I think, clearly - probably after 
19 the consent was taken is that a statute of 
20 limitations starts to run when there's a cause of 
21 action and the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of 
22 reasonable care, should know. 
23 All of die affidavits and documentation 
24 in the file indicates that Miss Safsten knew - and 
25 described it in the context which counsel quoted, 
Page2S 
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1 was dropped in the amended complaint. They are not 
2 seeking rescission. But in that case - even if the 
3 Court were to look at it from the perspective of 
4 rescission, in that case the Plaintiff had economic 
5 damages. The award of damages was based on economic 
6 loss. Here, there is no economic loss alleged. They 
7 analogize, again, to the wrongful death cases, but, 
8 Your Honor, wrongful death is a purely statutory 
9 cause of action, and it is based on the death of the 
10 son. We, in our reply brief, have cited the Boucher 
11 (phonetic) case, which is a case against the hospital 
12 tor loss of filial - filial damage, loss of 
13 relationship, loss of services, loss of love and 
14 companionship of a son, who was not killed, but who 
15 was greatly injured And the Utah Supreme Court said 
16 there is no cause of action for loss of filial 
17 consortium. There is no such claim in Utah. And so 
18 if that's what they are now claiming, that is also 
19 precluded, clearly, in the law. 
20 Your Honor, L.D.S. Social Services 
21 sympathizes with the Plaintiff. Adoption is a very 
22 emotional, heart rendering process to go through. We 
23 don't deny that she hurt. She hurt badly. But she 
24 also waited too long to bring the claim. Her 
25 repeated complaints to the agency, to church 
1 that there was not a day that passed that Plaintiff 
2 has not felt deep heartache and void for the loss of 
3 her child. 
4 She - the act that damaged her was the 
5 consent document. The doctor prescribed the 
6 Thorazine. The nurse, probably, at St. Benedicts 
7 probably administered it. And that was a readily 
8 discoverable fact. If it wasn't voluntarily 
9 surrendered by the execution of a consent, certainly 
10 a subpoena would have provided that information very 
11 quickly. 
12 TTie only thing that the L.D.S. Social 
13 Service did was, I suppose, have some free counseling 
14 sessions with her ana men they took the consent. 
15 And that's why the Court's rejected they rendered -
16 they have not rendered any medical care, even though 
17 a social worker can counsel someone. She took a 
18 concept And it was the Court's conclusion that 
19 that's not provision of medical services or health 
20 care services. 
21 The Court finds, as a matter of law from 
22 the facts stated herein, that she knew that she was 
23 injured once she had her full faculties following the 
24 birth of the child; that she didn't take steps to 
25 reasonably discover what, if any, the cause of any 
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1 incapacity was. 
2 The Court finds that, by any applicable 
3 statute of limitations, the case on all causes of 
4 action is time-barred; and is dismissed, accordingly, 
5 with prejudice. 
6 Will you submit an appropriate order? 
7 MR. NELSON-. Yes, Your Honor. 
8 MR. HACKWELL: Your Honor, in 
9 consideration of the other motion --
10 THE COURT: It is now moot. 
hi MR. NELSON: Very well. Thank you. 
12 MR. HACKWELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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David M. McConkie (A2154) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NANCY G. SAFSTEN, 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 930902822PI 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Utah : 
corporation; THE CORPORATION OF 
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE : Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF : 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah : 
corporation, and DOES 1-10, : 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs Motion for Permission to File a Second Amended Complaint came 
before the court for decision, without oral argument, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of 
Judicial Administration. The Court, having considered the opposing memoranda and 
arguments of the parties, entered a Ruling on February 20,1996 denying plaintiffs motion. 
HLEDtfisiMUlbtrJitt 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 H 199S 
Based on that Ruling, the Court now hereby orders that plaintiffs motion is 
denied for the reasons that the proposed amendment (1) alleges no actionable misconduct 
by the additional parties; (2) identifies no specific policies to be at issue; and (3) adds 
nothing of substance to the case. 
DATED this 2Lb ~aay of March, 1996. 
District Court Judge j) ^ ^ £ ^ U -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed the foregoing ORDER this J_ day 
of March, 1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Richard G. Hackwell, Esq. 
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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RICHARD G. HACKWELL (5075) 
Eighth Floor Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534 
Telephone: (801) 531-83 00 
Facsimile: (801) 3 63-242 0 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NANCY SAFSTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, Inc., 
a Utah Corporation; THE 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah Corporation; and 
DOES 1-30, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Jury Trial Requested 
Case No. 930902822PI 
The Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiff Nancy Safsten complains of defendants as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is an individual and a resident of Davis 
County. 
2. Defendant LDS Social Services, Inc. ("Social Services") 
is a Utah Corporation with its principal place of business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
3. Defendant Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. ("CPB") is a Utah 
A A r 4 A A 
Corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
4. Does 1 through 10 are agents or employees of Social 
Services. 
5. Does 11 through 20 are agents or employees of CPB. 
6. Does 21 through 30 are other affiliates, employees or 
agents of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the 
"Church"). 
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4. 
8. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-13-7. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. In January, 1967, plaintiff was 23 years old, a graduate 
student at Illinois Teacher's College -- Chicago North (now 
Northeastern Illinois University) and pregnant as a result of an 
acquaintance rape. 
10. Plaintiff was then and is now a member of the Church. 
11. Plaintiff desired to obtain the Church's advice regarding 
her pregnancy. Plaintiff obtained that advice from the Church's 
Relief Society and its Social Service department. The "Social 
Service and Child Welfare Department of the Relief Society General 
Board Association" was predecessor in interest to defendant Social 
Services (together referred to as "Social Services"). 
2 
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12. Social Services was a Licensed Child Placing Agency 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 and §55-8-1, et seq. 
13. Social Services is an agent of the CPB; as Social 
Service's principal, the CPB is liable for Social Service's conduct 
within the scope of that agency. 
14. The CPB establishes the policy under which Social 
Services takes consents for adoption. CPB established the policy 
under which Social Services took the consent to adopt at issue in 
this litigation. 
15. As a Licensed Child Placing Agency, Social Services was 
allowed to take a birth mother's consent to adoption under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-30-4. 
16. Plaintiff did not give and legally could not have given 
her consent to the adoption before entering the hospital and giving 
birth. 
17. Plaintiff entered St. Benedict's Hospital (the 
"Hospital") on January 14, 1967/ on January 14, 1967, plaintiff 
gave birth to a healthy son. 
18. Immediately after plaintiff gave birth and throughout her 
Hospital stay, plaintiff's physician directed the Hospital to 
administer the antipsychotic drug Thorazine. 
19. The Thorazine physically and mentally incapacitated 
plaintiff; at times, plaintiff completely lost consciousness. 
20. On January 16, 1967, an employee of Social Services, 
acting as a licensed child placement agency under 78-30-4, obtained 
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plaintiff's signature on a document titled "Release" (the release) , 
a correct copy of which is attached as exhibit A. 
21. Based on the authority of the release and under the CPB's 
policy of the time, Social Services placed plaintiff's son for 
adoption; plaintiff's son was in fact adopted. 
22. Defendants had access to plaintiff's medical records. 
23. Defendants saw plaintiff's physical condition. 
24. Defendants knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the 
mental and legal capacity to give her consent to the adoption. 
25. On or about July 7, 1969, plaintiff asked the Hospital to 
provide her with a statement of her medical expenses from the 
delivery of her son so she could pay the bill herself. 
26. The Hospital replied that "the records of our no-
information maternity patients are destroyed". A correct copy of 
the Hospital's letter to plaintiff is attached as exhibit B. 
27. From the Hospital's reply, plaintiff reasonably assumed 
that her records had been destroyed and she could have no access to 
them. 
28. Over 23 years later, wholly by coincidence, plaintiff and 
her son were reunited. 
29. Plaintiff desired to obtain her son's medical records and 
so inquired of the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990. 
30. In response to plaintiff's inquiry, on or about May 29, 
1990, the Hospital gave plaintiff copies not of her son's records 
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as she had requested but of her own records, which she reasonably 
had assumed were destroyed. 
31. On or about May 29, 1990, on receipt of her own medical 
records, plaintiff learned for the first time that she had been 
drugged with Thorazine during her entire Hospital stay. 
32. In or about August, 1990, plaintiff visited Social 
Services to determine what documentation, if any, Social Services 
had of the authority it claimed in placing plaintiff's son for 
adoption. Plaintiff then obtained from Social Services a copy of 
the release. By matching the date plaintiff signed the release 
with her Hospital records, plaintiff discovered for the first time 
that Social Services had obtained her ostensible consent while she 
was incapacitated from the effects of the drug Thorazine. 
33. In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff could not and 
did not learn of or develop a reasonable suspicion until or after 
May 29, 1990, that Social Services had obtained her consent while 
she was incapacitated from the drug Thorazine. 
34. In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not 
discover until or after May 29, 1990, that she had been injured by 
the defendants' conduct. 
35. In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not learn 
of and in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have 
learned of the facts which give rise to her causes of action 
against defendants until or after May 29, 1990. 
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36. The last event necessary to complete plaintiff's causes 
of action against defendant occurred about or after May 29, 1990. 
37. Plaintiff's causes of action accrued about or after May 
29, 1990. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
38. Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 37. 
39. Social Services and its employees and agents had a duty 
to exercise reasonable care in its capacity as a Licensed Child 
Placement Agency. 
40. The CPB had a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
establishing the policies under which Social Services would take 
consents to adoption and in supervising Social Services. 
41. Defendants or their employees or agents breached that 
duty to exercise reasonable care by obtaining plaintiff's consent 
to the adoption and placing the child for adoption although it knew 
or should have known plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to give 
that consent. 
42. Defendants' employees or agents acted within the course 
and scope of their employment or agency in obtaining plaintiff's 
consent to the adoption and placing the child for adoption although 
it knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to 
give that consent; defendants are liable for their employees' or 
agent s' negligence. 
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43. Defendants' negligence directly and proximately injured 
plaintiff. 
44. Defendants' negligence directly and proximately caused 
plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Constructive Fraud) 
45. Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 44. 
46. The Church has several legal entities including the CPB 
and Social Services to which it assigns tasks and legal liability; 
each of those entities acts as a part of the Church or as the 
Church's agent in performing on the Church's behalf the tasks the 
Church assigns to it. 
47. Defendants have a clergy/member relationship with 
plaintiff. 
48. Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in defendants and 
defendants invited, accepted, or acquiesced in that trust; 
defendants had a confidential relationship with plaintiff. 
49. By their confidential relationship with plaintiff, 
defendants had a duty to act primarily for plaintiff's benefit in 
the adoption transaction. 
50. Defendants breached that duty by obtaining plaintiff's 
consent to the adoption and placing the child for adoption although 
they knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the legal capacity 
to give that consent. 
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51. Defendants' breach of duty directly and proximately 
caused plaintiff damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 
52. Defendants' conduct manifests a reckless disregard of or 
indifference to plaintiff's rights. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
53. Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 52. 
54. Defendants acted outrageously in obtaining plaintiff's 
consent to the adoption and placing the child for adoption although 
they knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the mental and 
legal capacity to give that consent. 
55. Defendants intended to cause or recklessly disregarded 
the probability of causing emotional distress to plaintiff. 
56. Defendants' conduct actually and proximately caused 
Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. 
57. Defendants' conduct manifests a reckless disregard of or 
indifference to plaintiff's rights. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
58- Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 57. 
59. Plaintiff and defendants entered a contract, the 
ostensible terms of which were that if plaintiff decided to allow 
her son to be adopted, plaintiff would allow Social Services to 
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place her son for adoption and Social Services, acting as a 
Licensed Child Placement Agency, agreed to place plaintiff's son 
for adoption if plaintiff so chose. 
60. Defendants breached that contract by obtaining 
plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for 
adoption although plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to give that 
consent. 
61. Rescission of the contract is impossible or highly 
impractical. 
62. Defendants' breach of contract directly and proximately 
caused plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount to be proved at 
trial. 
JURY DEMAND 
63. Plaintiff requests that trial of this action be heard by 
a jury. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For exemplary or punitive damages as appropriate; 
2. For compensatory damages in an amount to be proved at 
trial; 
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3. For the costs plaintiff incurs in bringing this action; 
and, 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court may award, 
DATED February 23, 1995. 
Richard G. Hackwell 
Plaintiff's address: 
320 West 300 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on February 23, 1995, a correct copy of the 
attached amended complaint was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
David M. McConkie, Esq. 
Thomas D. Walk, Esq. 
Kirton SL McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004; 
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^ 
STATE OF 7 c ^cVu ) 
• ) R E L E A S E 
COUNTY oruu^Ut ^ ) 
****** 
I, yi t\~-i -LA c-i . ^  v>^. * <*.,, ^  , AKA / ) AJ<^ J\A\~ri<*:c~'t~ts 
of V ? i-'•• x */-' * f >< i County of v^<^-~r <.«^ i State of 
f being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. That I am the unmarried mother of a certain %y>* ^J\ child of 
the white race born to me at (\Lr\ <+{ j ^ ^ , County of l+y^u^.t , , 
State of ~7.<: f.**lLj , on the /4 day of 
19^ ? V: that said child was conceived and born out of wedlock. 
2. That I have been in sole custody and control of said-child since 
the birth of said child, but am unable to give said child a proper name, or care. 
That I hereby Covenant and Agree that if the 8ocial 9ervlce and Child Welfare 
Department of the Relief 8ociety General Board Association, hereinafter called 
the "Licensed Agency," will accept said child for placement or adoption, that I 
shall never interfere with or attempt in any manner to locate said child, or to 
ascertain the whereabouta of said child or interfere with said placement or 
atloption in any manner whatsoever. 
3. That I hereby consent that the Licensed Agency, may make provisions 
for the medical care of said child, give consent for operations, make other 
deoialons or give other consents that have to do with the health and welfare of 
said child, 
*»• That I hereby releaae all of my right, title and interest in and to 
eald ohild and to the earninge of eaid child and aleo all of my right in and to 
the ouatody and control of eeid child to the said Licensed Agency, and hereby 
authorize and requeet eaid Liceneed Agency, at its eole diecretion, to place said 
child in a home for adoption. 
5* That I hereby release said child, with the intention formed after 
carefully considering the matter, and I will never again olaim any right, title 
or interest in and to said child or to the service or earnings of said minojc 
child or to the custody or control of eaid child. 
EXHIBIT A 
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6, That said Licensed Agency may place said child with any person 
or persons of good moral character who may be able to furnish said minor child 
with a proper name, home and care, and that said person or persons may adopt 
said child to the end that it may have a home, name and proper care, and that I 
hereby consent and agree that the question of fitness of the person or persons 
who shall adopt said child and who is or are to have the care, custody and 
control of said child shall be left exclusively to the judgement of said 
Licensed Agency, and the Judge of the Court before whom the adoption proceedings 
may be held. 
7. That I hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which 
may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of 
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof. 
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and 
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and 
make and execute the same without any threat or promise. 
Witness my hand this /A day of V h a ^ ^ t ^ ^ . ^ , 19£ 7. at 
. State of 
iOTpERy M01 
L£^L 
KA *J A
STATE Ql\tt2'L ) 
if \ o g 
COUNTY {X^qUi/uA^ ) 
On the /V> day of M f ^ ^ W ^ * 4 ? • 1 9 ^ % personally 
appeared before met /Zt^->^<i^i s*(2<rt<^*£-*\*ts » 
^_ j 
the signer of the foregoing Instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she 
executed the same. /) 
My commission expires: /J>< t^'ty*s SY C*>S^QC-^**-* 
t ^ r ^ . C /,* fig R e s i d e n t ^ A-a4</l^cJ,: tifuJ?.O/lZ*/. 
i l T- /\ 4 s\ t>-
may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the puryosi of 
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof. 
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and 
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and 
make and execute the same without any threat or promise. 
Witness my hand this //> day of \ YdL-ri't'i^&y. c-. , 1^, ?.» at 
$.««('-y*-' • County of // 'l<J*du<<. . , State of (JUX 
MOTHER A 
AKA 
STATE OF V tfa'L ) 
COUNTY 0?-</l/jA/a.'LS ) 
On the /'/> day of \i(3-W-L* gst.** , 19^*?. personally 
appeared before me, • / ^ t y n i l i . ^ v ^ y ^ u - t y . AKA 0-*t^t/<— fiA*~>+ 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she 
executed the same. A 
My commission expires: /J^tf^i*tynS ^Y f / /^ /^*< 
\Kfi*.. C Af fia Residence; d.*U</l2J^f. &"^ji• {"&^> 
CJIK£ 
vn i2 ( 
S T . BENEDICT'S H O S P I T A L 
BUSINESS OFFICE 
3000 POLK AVENUE 
OGDEN. UTAH 
July 7, 1969 
Dear Mrs. Gardner: 
This is in reply to your request for the amount of your maternity bill in 
January of 1967 • 
Since the records of our no information maternity patients are destroyed, 
I can only send you an estimated amount• Based on the charges in effect 
at that time, it appears that your bill for three days care for you and 
your baby and the delivery charges would have come to about $220.00. 
I hope this is sufficient for your needs• 
Sincere*, ^  £ j ^ , 
Mrs* Beth Baker 
Asst# Office Manager 
EXHIBIT B 
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RICHARD G. HACKWELL (5075) EXHIBIT 
Eighth Floor Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534 
Telephone: (801) 531-8300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-2420 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NANCY SAFSTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, Inc., 
a Utah Corporation; THE 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah Corporation sole; 
THE CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY 
SAINTS, a Utah Corporation 
sole; THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, a 
nonprofit corporation; and 
DOES 1-28, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Jury Trial Requested 
Case No. 930902822PI 
The Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiff Nancy Safsten complains of defendants as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is an individual and a resident of Davis 
County. 
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2. Defendant LDS Social Services, Inc. ("Social Services") 
is a Utah Corporation with its principal place of business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
3. Defendant Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. ("CPB") is a Utah 
Corporation sole with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
4. Defendant Corporation of the President of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. ("CPC") is a Utah 
corporation sole with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. CPC previously was named in this action as a Doe 
defendant. 
5. Defendant Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
(the "Church") is a nonprofit corporation with its principal place 
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. The Church previously was 
named in this action as a Doe defendant. 
6. Does 1 through 10 are agents or employees of Social 
Services. 
7. Does 11 through 20 are agents or employees of CPB or CPC. 
8. Does 21 through 28 are other affiliates, employees or 
agents of the Church. 
9. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4. 
10. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-13-7. 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
11. In January, 1967, plaintiff was 23 years old, a graduate 
student at Illinois Teacher's College -- Chicago North (now 
Northeastern Illinois University) and pregnant as a result of an 
acquaintance rape. 
12. Plaintiff was then and is now a member of the Church. 
13. Plaintiff desired to obtain the Church's advice regarding 
her pregnancy. Plaintiff obtained that advice from the Church's 
Relief Society, predecessor in interest to defendant Social 
Services (together referred to as "Social Services"). 
14. Social Services was a Licensed Child Placing Agency 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 and §55-8-1, et seq. 
15. Certain of Does 21-28 held the office of Presiding Bishop 
of the Church during the time in question (the "Presiding Bishop 
defendants"). The Presiding Bishop Defendants supervised and 
established policy for Social Services on behalf of and as agents 
of the Church. 
16. Certain of Does 21-28 were general authorities of the 
Church who established the policy under which Social Services took 
consents for adoption during the time in question (the "General 
Authority defendants"). The General Authority defendants 
supervised and established policy for Social Services on behalf and 
as agents of the Church. 
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17. As a Licensed Child Placing Agency, Social Services was 
allowed to take a birth mother's consent to adoption under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-30-4. 
18. Plaintiff did not give and legally could not have given 
her consent to the adoption before entering the hospital and giving 
birth. 
19. Plaintiff entered St. Benedict's Hospital (the 
"Hospital") on January 14, 1967; on January 14, 1967, plaintiff 
gave birth to a healthy son. 
20. Immediately after plaintiff gave birth and throughout her 
Hospital stay, plaintiff's physician directed the Hospital to 
administer the antipsychotic drug Thorazine. 
21. The Thorazine physically and mentally incapacitated 
plaintiff; at times, plaintiff completely lost consciousness. 
22. On January 16, 1967, an employee of Social Services, 
acting as a licensed child placement agency under 78-30-4, obtained 
plaintiff's signature on a document titled "Release" (the release), 
a correct copy of which is attached as exhibit A. 
23. Based on the authority of the release and under the 
Church's policy of the time, Social Services placed plaintiff's son 
for adoption; plaintiff's son was in fact adopted. 
24. Social Services had access to plaintiff's medical 
records. 
25. Social Services' agent or employee saw plaintiff's 
physical condition. 
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26. Social Services knew or should have known plaintiff 
lacked the mental and legal capacity to give her consent to the 
adoption. 
27. On or about July 7, 1969, plaintiff asked the Hospital to 
provide her with a statement of her medical expenses from the 
delivery of her son so she could pay the bill herself. 
28. The Hospital replied that "the records of our no-
information maternity patients are destroyed". A correct copy of 
the Hospital's letter to plaintiff is attached as exhibit B. 
29. From the Hospital's reply, plaintiff reasonably assumed 
that her records had been destroyed and she could have no access to 
them. 
30. Over 23 years later, wholly by coincidence, plaintiff and 
her son were reunited. 
31. Plaintiff desired to obtain her son's medical records and 
so inquired of the Hospital on or about May 29, 1990. 
32. In response to plaintiff's inquiry, on or about May 29, 
1990, the Hospital gave plaintiff copies not of her son's records 
as she had requested but of her own records, which she reasonably 
had assumed were destroyed. 
33. On or about May 29, 1990, on receipt of her own medical 
records, plaintiff learned for the first time she had been drugged 
with Thorazine during her entire Hospital stay. 
34. In or about August, 1990, plaintiff visited Social 
Services to determine what documentation, if any, Social Services 
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had of the authority it claimed in placing plaintiff's son for 
adoption. Plaintiff then obtained from Social Services a copy of 
the release. By matching the date plaintiff signed the release 
with her Hospital records, plaintiff discovered for the first time 
that Social Services had obtained her ostensible consent while she 
was incapacitated from the effects of the drug Thorazine. 
35. In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff could not and 
did not learn of or develop a reasonable suspicion until or after 
May 29, 1990, that Social Services had obtained her consent while 
she was incapacitated from the drug Thorazine. 
36. In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not 
discover until or after May 29, 1990, that she had been injured by 
the defendants7 conduct. 
37. In spite of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not learn 
of and in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have 
learned of the facts which give rise to her causes of action 
against defendants until or after May 29, 1990. 
38. The last event n€>cessary to complete plaintiff's causes 
of action against defendants occurred about or after May 29, 1990. 
39. Plaintiff's causes of action accrued about or after May 
29, 1990. 
40. Social Services, the Presiding Bishop defendants and the 
General Authority defendants (together the active defendants) are 
agents of the Church, the CPB or the CPC (together the passive 
defendants); the passive defendants are liable for the active 
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defendants' conduct. The CPB or CPC hold the Church's assets on 
behalf of the Church; assets held by the CPB or CPC are available 
to satisfy the Church's liabilities. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
41. Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40. 
42. Social Services and its employees and agents had a duty 
to exercise reasonable care in its capacity as a Licensed Child 
Placement Agency. 
43. The active defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in establishing the policies under which Social Services would 
take consents to adoption and in supervising Social Services. 
44. The active defendants or their employees or agents 
breached that duty to exercise reasonable care by obtaining 
plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for 
adoption although it knew or should have known plaintiff lacked the 
legal capacity to give that consent. 
45. Social Services' employees or agents acted within the 
course and scope of their employment or agency in obtaining 
plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for 
adoption although they knew or should have known plaintiff lacked 
the legal capacity to give that consent; Social Services is liable 
for its employees' or agents' negligence. 
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46. The active defendants acted within the course and scope 
of their employment or agency in establishing Social Service 
policy, in obtaining plaintiff's consent to the adoption and in 
placing the child for adoption although Social Services knew or 
should have known plaintiff lacked the mental and legal capacity to 
give that consent; the passive defendants are liable for the 
active defendants' negligence. 
47. Defendants' negligence directly and proximately injured 
plaintiff. 
48. Defendants' negligence directly and proximately caused 
plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount to be proved at trial. 
SECOND' CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Constructive Fraud) 
49. Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 48. 
50. The Church has a number of entities and individuals to 
which it assigns tasks and legal liability, including Social 
Services, the Presiding Bishop defendants, the General Authority 
defendants, CPB and CPC; each of those entities or individuals 
acts as a part of the Church or as the Church's agent in performing 
on the Church's behalf the tasks the Church assigns to it. 
51. As a member of the Church, plaintiff has a clergy/member 
relationship with defendants. 
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52. Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in defendants and 
defendants invited, accepted, or acquiesced in that trust; 
defendants had a confidential relationship with plaintiff. 
53. By their confidential relationship with plaintiff, 
defendants had a duty to act primarily for plaintiff's benefit in 
the adoption transaction. 
54. The active defendants breached that duty by obtaining 
plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for 
adoption although Social Services knew or should have known 
plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to give that consent, 
55. The active defendants' breach of duty directly and 
proximately caused plaintiff damages in an amount to be proved at 
trial. 
56. The active defendants' conduct manifests a reckless 
disregard of or indifference to plaintiff's rights. 
57. The active defendants acted within the course and scope 
of their employment or agency in their breach of duty; the passive 
defendants are liable for the active defendants' breach. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
58. Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 57. 
59. The active defendants acted outrageously in obtaining 
plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for 
adoption although Social Services knew or should have known 
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plaintiff lacked the mental and legal capacity to give that 
consent. 
60. The active defendants intended to cause or recklessly 
disregarded the probability of causing emotional distress to 
plaintiff. 
61. The active defendants' conduct actually and proximately 
caused Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. 
62. The active defendants' conduct manifests a reckless 
disregard of or indifference to plaintiff's rights. 
63. The active defendants acted within the course and scope 
of their employment or agency in establishing Social Services 
policy, in obtaining plaintiff's consent to the adoption and in 
placing the child for adoption although Social Services knew or 
should have known plaintiff lacked the mental and legal capacity to 
give that consent; the passive defendants are liable for the 
active defendants' conduct. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
64. Plaintiff here incorporates paragraphs 1 through 63, 
65. Plaintiff and defendants entered a contract, the 
ostensible terms of which were that if plaintiff decided to allow 
her son to be adopted, plaintiff would allow Social Services to 
place her son for adoption and Social Services, acting as a 
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Licensed Child Placement Agency, agreed to place plaintiff's son 
for adoption if plaintiff so chose. 
66. Defendants breached that contract by obtaining 
plaintiff's consent to the adoption and placing the child for 
adoption although plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to give that 
consent. 
67. Rescission of the contract is impossible or highly 
impractical; the Court has previously ruled that the contract 
cannot be rescinded. 
68. Defendants' breach of contract directly and proximately 
caused plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount to be proved at 
trial. 
JURY DEMAND 
69. Plaintiff requests that trial of this action be heard by 
a jury. 
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WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For exemplary or punitive damages as appropriate; 
2. For compensatory damages in an amount to be proved at 
trial; 
and, 
3. For the costs plaintiff incurs in bringing this action; 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court may award. 
DATED , 1995. 
EXHIBIT 
Richard G. Hackwell 
Plaintiff's address: 
320 West 300 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on , a correct copy of 
attached second amended complaint was mailed, postage prepaid, 
the following: 
David M. McConkie, Esq. 
Merrill F. Nelson, Esq. 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
EXHIBIT 
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STATE OF 7 c / n V . ) Wfi£tl+»> 
v _ , ) R E L E A S E ' ' * / / / £ > • » 
COUNTY OF 7<.'<./..< *. - ) ^iU/T/&/ 
V r* -r (^'* i-L' 
of //' l- . .\ i / t * ( .<' , County of </_C si^r < <-T , State of 
/'I t/r'sft. being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. That I am the unmarried mother of a certain V?? ^ ,/*Ml. child of 
the white race born to me at ( t ^ ^ /^^^ , County of L^y^Lx, , , 
State of ~*/';(S*ZLJ on tlie A / ^ . day of 
19^ 7: that said child was conceived and born out of wedlock. 
2. That I have been in sole custody and control of said child since 
the birth of said child, but am unable to give said child a proper name, or care. 
That I hereby Covenant and Agree that if the Social Service and Child Welfare 
Department of the Relief Society General Board Association, hereinafter called 
the "Licenaed Agency," will accept said child for placement or adoption, that I 
ahall never interfere with or attempt in any manner to locate said child, or to 
ascertain the whereabouts of aald child or interfere with said placement or 
adoption in any manner whatsoever. 
3. That I hereby conaent that the Licensed Agency may make provisions 
for the medical care of aald child, give conaent for operations, make other 
deoialona or give other conaenta that have to do with the health and welfare of 
said child, 
i}« That I hereby releaae all of my right, title and intereat in and to 
aald ohild and to the earninga of aald child and also all of my right in and to 
the cuatody and control of aald child to the aald Licenaed Agency, and hereby 
authorize and requeat aald Licenaed Agency, at ita sole discretion, to place said 
child in a home for adoption. 
5. That I hereby releaae aald child, with the intention formed after 
carefully conalderlng the matter, and I will never again olalm any right, title 
or Intereat in and to aald child or to the service or earninga of said minor 
child or to the cuatody or controf ^fiffil $hild. 
in*?* 
6. That said Licensed Agency may place said child wAth any person 
or persons of good moral character who may be able to furnish said minor child 
with a proper name, home and care, and that said person or persons may adopt 
said child to the end that it may have a home, name and proper care, and that I 
hereby consent and agree that the question of fitness of the person or persons 
who shall adopt said child and who is or are to have the care, custody and 
control of said child shall be left exclusively to the judgement of said 
Licensed Agency, and the Judge of the Court before whom the adoption proceedings 
may be held. 
7. That I hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which 
may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of 
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof. 
urther state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and 
know ot; ?nt;s* thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and 
make and execute the same without any threat or promise. 
Witness my hand this /'£ day of V ]^S^z^ct^k^r.e^ l^ljZi a t 
/j/.(t^f .^t./ , County of ^ C ^ / C ^ H State of 
OtHER tf M01 
I AKA 
STATE OfVd^T'/l ) 
COUNTY OZ^fi/ts/u <_^  ) 
On the /'•£ day of \J&->-?,-<•.£ in-x <•, , 19/ 9. personally 
appeared before rr** /V<v->^ t-<£t-i x2--/M^ «*^ .>t^ <^ - . AKA 
r J 
signer of tht foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that i 
executed the same. /} .t 
c^V^. ^ /**?£ Residencei ^ J^^Jl^JJ/ &^-
C A W . vroT<24Jf wry) o^er^'ir<2~ ^exrorr^ ^\\ 0-}i^r- resf>or\s-;b>f);">io 
• may be held courts of the State ot Utail, or tiisewnere, i.ov ± purpose ui 
determination of tne release and the adoption of 9aid child or any thereof. 
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and 
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and 
make and execute the same without any threat or promise. 
Witness my hand this //-. day of \ \<Z~-7^c<~-<y-^- c^_ • ^ 3«~Z» a t 
/ff'-rtV'- - " . County of // *<J*d<jg*. . State of 
MOtHER A 
KA «J A
STATE Ot^cfc'/^ ) 
COUNTY QX-^tUt/dL^ ) 
On the //, day of vl^^c^^t,^ , 19^7, personally 
appeared before me, /7-tw^.ix-i /j/-rU.Kt->T.^±^ , AKA ^ ^ , / ^ \ b /- 7 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she 
executed the same. /I 
My commission expires: yC^t /w^v^y JOr {,* s^^C-**""*-* 
r\yfaer 
0 0 01 W 
S T . B E N E D I C F S H O S I L 
3 0 0 0 POLK AVENUE 
OGDEN. UTAH 
July 7, 1969 
BUSINESS OFFICE 
Dear Mrs, Gardner: 
This is in reply to your request lor uf% four IWI b inil-j bill In 
January of 3 967 
Since the records of our no information maternity patients are destroyed, 
I can only send you an estimated amount. Based on the charges in effect 
at that time, it appears that your bill for three days care for you and 
your baby and the delivery charges would have come to about $220#00# 
_I hope this is sufficient for your needs• 
Sincere*, g ^ £J_^ 
Mrs. Beth Baker 
Aast. Office Manager 
EXHIBI 
©Wfsl 
flUOMSTMCUWni 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 2 0 1996 
<fc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD . 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
NANCY 6. SAFSTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY - Ri 
RULING 
CASE NO. 930902822 
mfl 
Oaputv r.iftrW 
Whil< nlair . - Complai lit1" adds 
additional named parties, it alleges 110 actionable misconduct on 
the par t of such additional parties. Also, the "Second Amended 
Complaint" alleges that the a«ld it: i on-.* I 'J»»J MmJi d 
established policy," but it does not identify any specific policies 
i n:ts "'"f siifK*r w i •. i on. 
Nothing of substance is auu^u u^ i, uw proposed tjmendme.nl' and 
it should denied as "fruitless" Plaintiff's Motion for 
Permission .- FiJf1 Merond Amended Complaint is denied. 
Counsel for defendants shal ] subnr er 
hereon. ^ 
Dated thus 2A day ol: February, 1996. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE \ •fiirffi&J* 
i) /'. n .# ^ », 
SAFSTEN V. LDS SOCIAL SERVICES PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry - Rule 4-501 Ruling, to the following, this 
day of February, 1996: 
Richard G. Hackwell 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
68 S. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1534 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
0 fl ft * " " 
